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Constituencies and Control in  
Statutory Drafting:  
Interviews with Government Tax Counsels 
Shu-Yi Oei * & Leigh Z. Osofsky** 
ABSTRACT: Tax statutes have long been derided as convoluted and 
unreadable. But there is little existing research about drafting practices that 
helps us contextualize such critiques. In this Article, we conduct the first in-
depth empirical examination of how tax law drafting and formulation 
decisions are made. We report findings from interviews with government 
counsels who participated in the tax legislative process over the past four 
decades. Our interviews revealed that tax legislation drafting decisions are 
both targeted to and controlled by experts. Most counsels did not consider 
statutory formulation or readability important, as long as substantive 
meaning was accurate. Many held this view because their intended audience 
was tax experts, regulation writers, and software companies, not ordinary 
taxpayers. When revising law, drafters prioritize preserving existing 
formulations to not upset settled expectations, even at the cost of increasing 
convolution. While members of Congress (“Members”), Members’ staff, and 
committee staff participate in high-level policy decisions, statutory 
formulation decisions are largely left to a small number of tax law specialists.  
Our findings carry important implications for statutory interpretation, 
affirming prior research, but also calling into deeper question arguments for 
textualism and the validity of certain interpretive canons. Our findings also 
have important implications for the design of our tax system, illuminating 
the distributive tradeoffs inherent in drafting practices. Finally, our findings 
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reveal a contrast between public expectations about the legislative process and 
how the process actually works, underscoring underexplored questions about 
what makes this process legitimate.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
The end of 2017 saw Congress pass the most sweeping tax legislation in 
over thirty years.1 The media, academics, and policymakers have derided this 
 
 1. Thomas Kaplan, House Gives Final Approval to Sweeping Tax Overhaul, N.Y. TIMES  
(Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/20/us/politics/tax-bill-republicans.html; 
Damian Paletta & Jeff Stein, Sweeping Tax Overhaul Clears Congress, WASH. POST (Dec. 20, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/gop-tax-bill-passes-congress-as-trump-prepares-
to-sign-it-into-law/2017/12/20/0ba2fd98-e597-11e7-9ec2-518810e7d44d_story.html; Deirdre Walsh 
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new tax bill based on both its substantive policies and the process of its 
creation. Commentators have protested the speed with which the bill passed 
through Congress,2 its shoddy drafting,3 its complexity,4 and its multitude of 
loopholes (which were often attributed, at least in part, to the speed of 
enactment).5 Relatedly, Democratic Senators have complained that they did 
not have time to read the Senate bill before it passed, and that the bill was 
passed in a form containing hastily scribbled handwritten notes.6 At all stages 
of the bill’s journey through Congress, commentators criticized the fact that 
the process happened too fast and that votes were taken without sufficient 
opportunity to consider the actual legislative language.7 In short, substantive 
policy aside, the passage of the 2017 tax bill brought significant attention to 
the tax legislative process and the way tax statutes are actually written and 
passed as part of that process.  
Surprisingly, while there is widespread familiarity with the basics of the 
tax legislative process,8 there has been little in-depth research about how 
 
et al., White House, GOP Celebrate Passing Sweeping Tax Bill, CNN (Dec. 20, 2017, 5:37 PM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2017/12/20/politics/house-senate-trump-tax-bill/index.html.   
 2. Erica Werner, Precision Sacrificed for Speed as GOP Rushes Ahead on Taxes, WASH. POST  
(Dec. 10, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/precision-sacrificed-for-speed-
as-gop-rushes-ahead-on-taxes/2017/12/10/876ab274-dc62-11e7-b1a8-62589434a581_story.html.  
 3. See David Kamin et al., The Games They Will Play: Tax Games, Roadblocks, and Glitches Under 
the 2017 Tax Legislation, 103 MINN. L. REV. 1439, 1442–44 (2019).  
 4. Adam Looney, How the New Tax Bill Encourages Tax Avoidance, BROOKINGS INST.: 
UNPACKED (Dec. 14, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/unpacked/2017/12/14/how-
the-new-tax-bill-encourages-tax-avoidance.  
 5. Edward J. McCaffery, The Tax Bill’s Loopholes for the Wealthy Benefit Trump and Corker, CNN 
(Dec. 18, 2017, 4:41 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/12/18/opinions/tax-plan-benefit-trump-
opinion-mccaffery/index.html; Matthew Wisner, Tax Bill Loopholes Still Exist for Wall Street Fat Cats: 
Trish Regan, FOXBUSINESS (Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.foxbusiness.com/politics/tax-bill-loop 
holes-still-exist-for-wall-street-fat-cats-trish-regan.  
   6. Josh Keefe, Senator Bob Corker Said he Hasn’t Read the Tax Bill, Denies Changing his Vote in 
Exchange for Personal Tax Breaks, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2017, 6:50 PM), https://www.ib 
times.com/political-capital/senator-bob-corker-said-he-hasnt-read-tax-bill-denies-changing-his-vote-
exchange (criticizing Members not having time to read the bill before voting on it); Jim 
Tankersley & Alan Rappeport, A Hasty, Hand-Scribbled Tax Bill Sets Off an Outcry, N.Y. TIMES  
(Dec. 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/01/us/politics/hand-scribbled-tax-bill-outcry.html; 
Z. Byron Wolf, The Senate Voted on a Tax Bill Pretty Much Nobody Had Read, CNN (Dec. 2, 2017,  
5:20 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/12/01/politics/senate-vote-still-writing-tax-bill/index.html.  
 7. John Cassidy, The Passage of the Senate Republican Tax Bill Was a Travesty, NEW YORKER 
(Dec. 2, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/sections/news/the-passage-of-the-senate-republican-
tax-bill-was-a-travesty.   
 8. For discussion of the tax legislative process, see generally Ronald A. Pearlman, The Tax 
Legislative Process: 1972–1992, 57 TAX NOTES 939 (1992); George K. Yin, Codification of the Tax Law and 
the Emergence of the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation (Va. Law & Econs. Research Paper No. 2017-20, 
2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3008878. A significant empirical 
legal literature has begun to develop regarding the legislative process generally. Lisa Schultz 
Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of 
Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, 66 STAN. L. REV. 725, 731–33 (2014) 
[hereinafter Gluck & Bressman II]; Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation 
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substantive tax policy is turned into actual statutory language.9 As a result, we 
have little means to understand why the tax statutes in the Internal Revenue 
Code (“I.R.C.” or “Code”) are drafted the way they are. For example, why does 
the Code sometimes state a broad general rule followed by exceptions that 
swallow the rule, rather than simply stating a narrower general rule? Why do 
exceptions sometimes appear in the same Code provision as the general rule, 
but are other times buried far away? How do drafters determine when to 
create a new defined term, as opposed to borrowing a pre-existing definition 
or leaving the term undefined? Who makes such choices and how are they 
made?  
While these questions may seem dry and technical, they are anything but. 
The way our tax statutes are drafted can determine how accessible they are 
and to whom, can impact how taxpayers understand and interact with the tax 
system, can shape societal attitudes towards tax law, and can even affect how 
legislative power is allocated.  
In this Article, we undertake the first extensive empirical examination of 
how those responsible for creating tax legislation make drafting and 
articulation choices, and what factors they consider when they do so. We 
report the findings of 26 in-depth interviews we conducted with government 
counsels who have participated in the tax legislative process over the last four 
decades, to explore how and why certain drafting and formulation decisions 
are made and the implications of these decisions.  
We found that a majority of those interviewed did not pay much attention 
to how a statute was formulated, and did not think it mattered, as long as the 
intended rule was accurately articulated. The reason for this was that many 
interviewees viewed the Code as written for experts, the U.S. Department of 
the Treasury (“Treasury”), and software companies, rather than for ordinary 
taxpayers. We further found that interviewees perceived tax statutes to be 
sticky and prioritized preservation of existing formulations: Once a particular 
provision is placed in the Code, congressional dynamics and a desire to not 
upset settled expectations make changing prior statutory text difficult. 
Interviewees also reported that drafters at the House and Senate Office of 
Legislative Counsel took primary responsibility and control over turning 
policies into statutory language, and that other participants in the process 
almost completely deferred to Legislative Counsel on formulation issues, even 
 
from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I,  
65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 924–48 (2013) [hereinafter Gluck & Bressman I]; Victoria F. Nourse  
& Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 
577–78 (2002); Jarrod Shobe, Intertemporal Statutory Interpretation and the Evolution of Legislative 
Drafting, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 807, 811 (2014). 
 9. For an early exception, see Michael Livingston, Congress, the Courts, and the Code: 
Legislative History and the Interpretation of Tax Statutes, 69 TEX. L. REV. 819, 822–23 (1991) 
(discussing the realities of the tax legislative process, informed by the author’s experience as a 
Legislation Attorney with the Joint Committee on Taxation, and exploring the implications for 
interpretation of tax statutes and use of legislative history in particular).  
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though these other participants would participate in higher level substantive 
policy discussions and decisions.10  
However, interviewees also described the ways the tax legislative process 
(and within it, the drafting process) has shifted over time and varies 
depending on context. For example, some suggested that the process has 
moved from an expertise-driven model to one with more amorphous control, 
with more lobbyist and industry group participation. Others noted how 
drafting of major legislation differs from drafting in the ordinary course. 
These findings have important implications. First, they affirm the 
findings of an important body of legal literature regarding the implications of 
legislative drafting practices for judicial theories of interpretation, particularly 
textualism.11 Notably, scholars have previously found that members of 
Congress (“Members”) focus on legislation at a policy level, not at the level of 
actual drafting of the legislative text.12 Our findings support some of the 
conclusions drawn in that literature. However, by revealing the sometimes 
idiosyncratic reasons why formulation decisions are actually made in drafting 
tax legislation, and exposing the strong inertial tendencies inherent in 
statutory formulations, our findings also call textualism and other interpretive 
canons even more deeply into question.  
Second, our study has broad implications for the tax system, not just in 
the small number of cases in which statutory language is litigated, but also in 
the much broader circumstances where tax law is applied without judicial 
intervention. Our findings show how a variety of drafting dynamics 
—including many counsels’ views that formulation choices do not matter, the 
 
 10. See Office of the Legislative Counsel: U.S. House of Representatives, https://legcounsel. 
house.gov (last visited Oct. 24, 2018) (describing the role and function of the House Office of 
Legislative Counsel); Office of the Legislative Counsel: United States Senate, https://www.slc.senate.gov (last 
visited Oct. 24, 2018) (describing the role and function of the Senate Office of Legislative Counsel).  
 11. Gluck & Bressman I, supra note 8, at 912–14; Gluck & Bressman II, supra note 8, at 784–90 
(exploring impact of findings on textualism and other theories of judicial interpretation); Nourse 
& Schacter, supra note 8, at 616–21 (exploring implications of findings for theories of judicial 
interpretation, in particular raising problems for textualism and originalism); Livingston, supra note 9, 
at 836–38, 872–86 (discussing significance of drafting for statutory interpretation); Shobe, supra 
note 8, at 851–60 (examining textualism in light of findings); see also BJ Ard, Comment, Interpreting 
by the Book: Legislative Drafting Manuals and Statutory Interpretation, 120 YALE L.J. 185, 194–200 (2010) 
(examining drafting manuals and the puzzle they pose for textualists); Grace E. Hart, Note, State 
Legislative Drafting Manuals and Statutory Interpretation, 126 YALE L.J. 438, 443 (2016) (surveying 
drafting manuals used by drafters in state legislatures to inform statutory interpretation). 
 12. See, e.g., Gluck & Bressman I, supra note 8, at 940 (finding that Members interact with 
abstract legislative policy rather than the granular text); Nourse & Schacter, supra note 8, at 585 
(finding that legislative text is mostly drafted by staff); see also Livingston, supra note 9, at 833–36 
(asserting that the same is true in the tax legislative process). While our study focuses on how 
drafting choices are made for given substantive content, which was not the focus of any of these 
prior studies, at times our interviews touched on similar issues (such as, for instance, Congress’s 
general lack of involvement in the details of statutory drafting). We note any replication of 
findings. See, e.g., Leonard E. Burman et al., A Call for Replication Studies, 38 PUB. FIN. REV. 787, 
787–88 (2010) (pointing to the importance of replication in empirical research).   
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difficulty of making technical corrections or cleaning up the Code, the desire 
not to upset existing users’ understandings of the law, and other constraints 
on drafters—lead to strong inertial tendencies, whereby the law accrues in a 
layer-cake fashion over time and becomes ever more convoluted. These 
dynamics are a significant but underappreciated contributor to legal 
complexity, and they point to distributional tradeoffs in the law’s formulation. 
By focusing on the benefits of keeping the law’s formulation the same for 
existing users, drafters may inadvertently privilege entrenched interests 
relative to newcomers and laypersons who may struggle with the law’s 
formulation. Unearthing these dynamics allows tradeoffs between groups to 
be more consciously evaluated as such.  
Our finding that ordinary taxpayers are not the intended audience of tax 
statutes also reveals a tension, whereby potentially disproportionate 
responsibilities are placed on taxpayers who are not expected to understand 
the law. Even though drafters do not expect ordinary taxpayers to understand 
or even read tax statutes, principal responsibility—backed up by attestation 
clauses and penalties—is nonetheless placed on taxpayers to fill out accurate 
and compliant tax returns. This is done even if the taxpayer uses a preparer 
or tax preparation software. Resolving this tension through rethinking of 
penalty systems or fundamental reforms is difficult. This serves as a caution 
about the costs of drafting expert-centric law that its principal subjects are not 
expected to understand.  
Finally, our findings provide fresh insights regarding the tax legislative 
process, revealing a contrast between public expectations and narratives 
about the legislative process and how the process actually works. This raises 
critical questions about the legitimacy of the legislative process, and how 
power is allocated and exercised as part of that process.  
We proceed as follows. In Part II, we summarize the process for enacting 
tax law, show that there are different potential approaches the drafter can 
choose in articulating given substantive content, and then explore the 
potential effects of these choices.13 In Part III, we describe our research 
methodology and summarize our empirical findings from the in-depth 
interviews we conducted with government counsels regarding tax legislative 
drafting.14 In Part IV, we explore the implications of our findings for judicial 
theories of statutory interpretation, for the tax system, and for the legislative 
process.15 In Part V, we conclude.16  
 
 13. See infra Part II. 
 14. See infra Part III. 
 15. See infra Part IV. 
 16. See infra Part V. 
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II. THE TAX LEGISLATIVE PROCESS AND THE DRAFTING OF TAX STATUTES 
Tax academics have long-focused on substantive tax policy choices.17 
They have paid much less attention to drafting choices, or how substantive 
choices are formulated into actual legal content. In this Part, we discuss the 
types of drafting choices that drafters must make in turning substantive tax 
policy into statutory form, and explore why these drafting choices deserve 
attention.18 In order to understand drafting choices, it is important to 
appreciate the context in which they are made. Drafting is a part of the 
political process of making laws. Therefore, we first provide in Section II.A a 
brief overview of the tax legislative process, which is the process by which tax 
legislation is conceptualized, written, and (sometimes) passed by Congress.19 
A. UNDERSTANDING THE TAX LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 
 This Section provides what is often presented as the textbook tax 
legislative process. As scholars have increasingly recognized, there has been a 
rise in “unorthodox legislation,” or legislation passed through practices and 
procedures that do not follow the textbook process.20 In reporting our 
 
 17. Indeed, this statement is so clearly true that cites could include gigantic swaths of tax 
scholarship. To pick one issue, scholars have engaged in extensive debate about the merits of an 
income tax versus a consumption tax. See generally, e.g., William D. Andrews, A Consumption-Type 
or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1113 (1974) (conceptualizing a cash flow 
personal income tax); Joseph Bankman & David A. Weisbach, The Superiority of an Ideal 
Consumption Tax over an Ideal Income Tax, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1413 (2006) (arguing that an ideal 
consumption tax is superior to an ideal income tax); Daniel Shaviro, Beyond the Pro-Consumption 
Tax Consensus, 60 STAN. L. REV. 745 (2007) (challenging the case for the consumption tax by 
examining relationship to the permanent income hypothesis); Joseph Bankman & David 
Weisbach, Reply, Consumption Taxation Is Still Superior to Income Taxation, 60 STAN. L. REV. 789 
(2007) (addressing the arguments raised by Shaviro).  
 18. See infra Sections II.B–.C.  
 19. A full survey of the tax legislative process is beyond the scope of this article. For examples 
of scholarship studying the tax legislative process, see generally Harry L. Gutman, Reflections on 
the Process of Enacting Tax Law, 86 TAX NOTES 93 (2000) (discussing various facets of the tax 
legislative process in addition to areas in the tax code in need of rationalization); Pearlman, supra 
note 8 (discussing changes to the tax legislative process driven by budgetary concerns); George 
K. Yin, The Evolving Legislative Process: Implications for Tax Reform, 114 TAX NOTES 313 (2007) 
(discussing how trends in the legislative process affect tax reform); Yin, supra note 8 (describing 
the role of the Joint Committee on Taxation in the tax legislative process). 
 20. See generally BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING: NEW LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES 
IN THE U.S. CONGRESS (5th ed. 2017) (describing updated, foundational work regarding 
unorthodox legislation); Abbe R. Gluck et al., Unorthodox Lawmaking, Unorthodox Rulemaking,  
155 COLUM. L. REV. 1789 (2015) (developing an account of unorthodox legislation and 
unorthodox rulemaking and linking the two); Rebecca M. Kysar, Tax Law and the Eroding Budget 
Process, 81 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 61 (2018) (describing how pressure to enact recent tax 
reform has eroded traditional budget processes). In some ways, our findings in Part III about how 
formulation decisions are made interact with and capture how the actual legislative process 
differs from this textbook description. In future work, one of us will explore further the problems 
of legislative drafting errors that flow from unorthodox legislation and how best to fix them. 
Leigh Osofsky, Post-Legislation Gridlock (working paper) (on file with author).  
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findings in Section III.B, we note situations in which the descriptions that our 
interviewees provided deviate from the textbook process.21  
1. Origination in the House  
The U.S. Constitution provides that “[a]ll Bills for raising Revenue shall 
originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or 
concur with Amendments as on other Bills.”22 The effect of this “origination 
clause” is that proposed legislation is initiated in the House. Both the House 
and Senate consider tax legislation via tax-writing committees. The House 
Ways and Means Committee is the chief tax-writing committee of the House 
and begins the “formal” legislative process by considering the proposed tax 
legislation.23 Conceptually, however, ideas for proposed legislation may come 
from other sources, including the Treasury Department, the Administration, 
the IRS, or outside interests (e.g., industry and trade associations) and their 
lobbyists.24  
The House Committee on Ways and Means membership consists of 
majority and minority members (generally based on House representation).25 
The process of considering legislation traditionally begins with hearings 
where witnesses answer Member questions.26 After hearings, the proposed 
legislation is considered at a Ways and Means Committee “markup” session, 
in which the committee “reach[es] tentative decisions on specific issues.”27 
Markups are open to the public unless committee members vote to close the 
session.28 For example, the House markup session for the 2017 tax reform was 
publicly broadcast and is available online.29 Specialists have traditionally 
played an important role in the markup process. Staff of the Joint Committee 
on Taxation (“JCT”) (a nonpartisan congressional committee closely involved 
in the tax legislative process) assist in the development of the proposed 
 
 21. See, e.g., infra notes 125–30 and accompanying text (outlining differences in the case of 
major legislation).  
 22. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 7, cl. 1. 
 23. About, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, https://waysand 
means.house.gov/about (last visited Oct. 25, 2018). 
 24. BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND 
GIFT ¶ 116A.1 (2018). 
 25. Id. ¶ 116A.2; Full Committee, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 
https://waysandmeans.house.gov/subcommittee/full-committee (last visited Oct. 25, 2018).  
 26. In 1985, the Ways and Means Committee held 28 days of hearings on the bill that 
became the Tax Reform Act of 1986. BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 24, ¶ 116A.2. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id.  
 29. See Ways & Means Comm., Markup of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, YOUTUBE (Nov. 6, 2017), 
https://youtu.be/8rUjwgqNyMY; Ways & Means Comm., Markup of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Day 
2, YOUTUBE (Nov. 7, 2017), https://youtu.be/j6P3FgAlyzI; Ways & Means Comm., Markup of the 
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Day 3, YOUTUBE (Nov. 8, 2017), https://youtu.be/6gf_QBUyZFQ; Ways  
& Means Comm., Markup of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Day 4, YOUTUBE (Nov. 9, 2017), 
https://youtu.be/Vuz1VqHlveU.  
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legislation,30 as do Ways and Means Committee Staff and Member staff.31 
Treasury has also traditionally attended markup sessions, supplying revenue 
estimates, statistical data, and other advice.32  
 Once the Ways and Means Committee reports the bill, the full House 
considers and votes on the bill, pursuant to procedures issued by the Rules 
Committee of the House.33 If the vote is favorable, the bill becomes an Act of 
the House and is then sent along to the Senate. 
2. Senate Consideration 
As is the case with the House, the Senate’s consideration of tax legislation 
is done via a tax-writing committee, the Senate Finance Committee. Like Ways 
and Means, the Senate Finance Committee traditionally conducts hearings 
and holds a markup of its proposal.34 It may adopt the bill the House passed, 
or it may amend it. Senate changes may be small or large—large changes may 
constitute a whole new Senate bill.35 The bill (and accompanying committee 
report) is debated on the Senate floor, pursuant to Senate procedures.36 If 
the Senate version of the bill passes, and assuming that the Senate and House 
versions differ, the bill is returned to the House and a Conference 
Committee—a committee appointed by the House and Senate—is convened 
to reconcile the differences between the House and Senate bills. The 
reconciled Conference Committee version of the bill is then reported back to 
House and Senate, together with a Conference Committee report that 
explains the Conference Committee decisions.37 If both Houses approve the 
Conference Committee version, the enrolled bill goes to the President for 
signing. Absent a presidential veto, the bill becomes law. 
 
 30. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, U.S. CONG., ABOUT THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION 1, 
https://www.jct.gov/about-us/overview.html (last visited October 25, 2018).  
 31. BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 24, ¶ 116A.2. 
 32. Id. However, in 2017, Treasury did not release an assessment of the House tax plan. It 
did release a widely panned one-page analysis of the Senate Finance Committee tax bill 
suggesting that the tax reform would pay for itself. See Alan Rappeport & Jim Tankersley, Treasury 
Defends Tax Plan Cost with One-Page Analysis, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2017/12/11/us/politics/treasury-tax.html. 
 33. BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 24, ¶ 116A.2. 
 34. See FAQ: Committee Hearings, U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON FIN., https://www.finance.senate.gov/ 
about/faq (click on “What’s the difference between a hearing and an open executive session?”) 
(last visited Oct. 25, 2018) (noting the difference between hearings and “open executive 
sessions” or markups; hearings are held “to gather information and opinions on proposed 
legislation” while markups are “to debate, amend and rewrite proposed legislation before 
reporting the bill to the full Senate for consideration”). 
 35. BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 24, ¶ 116A.2. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
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3. The Joint Committee on Taxation   
As noted, specialists have traditionally played an important role in the tax 
legislative process. Such specialists include the staff of the nonpartisan JCT.38 
Established in 1926, the JCT’s role is to assist majority and minority Members 
of both Houses with tax legislation.39 Its staff includes tax attorneys, 
accountants, and economists.  
By statute and practice, the JCT’s role includes investigating the 
operation and effects of taxes and tax administration; investigating methods 
of tax simplification; making reports and recommendations to the House 
Ways and Means Committee and Senate Finance Committee (or House and 
Senate) on the results of such investigations and studies; making reports on 
the general state of the tax system to the Ways and Means Committee and 
Senate Finance Committee at least once every Congress (subject to the 
necessary appropriations); and assisting directly in the development and 
formation of statutory language.40  
The JCT is primarily responsible for writing the report that traditionally 
accompanies legislation in the House, including a detailed explanation of the 
bill, which forms part of the bill’s legislative history.41 In addition, the JCT is 
charged with “scoring” or providing official revenue estimates for tax 
legislation considered by either the House or Senate.42  
B. DRAFTING CHOICES 
The broad-strokes description set forth above and the background 
literature on how tax bills are passed43 do not capture how drafters make 
particular choices to translate substantive tax policy prescriptions into 
statutory language. Often, there is more than one way to articulate the same 
 
 38. For more details, see Joint Committee Role in the Tax Legislative Process, JOINT COMMITTEE 
ON TAX’N (1970), https://www.jct.gov/about-us/role-of-jct (explaining the role the Joint 
Committee on Taxation plays in creating tax legislation). 
 39. I.R.C. §§ 8001–8005 (2012); id. §§ 8021–8023; see also JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra 
note 30, at 1 (providing an overview of the role of the JCT). See generally Yin, supra note 8 
(providing a general overview of the tax legislative process). In this Article, we use the shorthand 
“Members” to refer to Members of Congress (in other words, elected congresspersons themselves).  
 40. I.R.C. § 8022; see also Yin, supra note 8 (manuscript at 4–5 & n.17) (citing E.W. 
KENWORTHY, Colin F. Stam: A Study in Anonymous Power, in ADVENTURES IN PUBLIC SERVICE 105, 
113–14 (Delia Kuhn & Ferdinand Kuhn, eds. 1963)) (discussing the prospect that JCT staff were 
directed to participate in tax legislation development). 
 41. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 30, at 1; BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 24, ¶ 116A.2.  
 42. 2 U.S.C. § 601(f) (2012). See generally Bernard M. “Bob” Shapiro, The Last 50 Years: The 
Evolving Role of the Joint Tax Committee, 151 TAX NOTES 1125 (2016) (discussing various aspects 
JCT’s role, including revenue estimates); Randall D. Weiss & James W. Wetzler, The Evolution of 
Economics at the Joint Committee on Taxation, Part 2, 151 TAX NOTES 1113 (2016) (discussing 
revenue estimation role of the JCT). 
 43. See, e.g., supra note 19. 
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substantive tax rule, so the statutory drafter must make choices. In this Section 
II.B, we highlight some of the different choices that drafters face.   
1. Rules vs. Exceptions  
It is well recognized that any exception can also be formulated as a 
general rule.44 Frederick Schauer has famously argued that, for this reason, 
exceptions and general rules are indistinguishable, and exceptions therefore 
carry no independent jurisprudential weight.45 Schauer uses the example of 
fornication to illustrate the point.46 A rule that sex outside of marriage is 
illegal may be formulated in a number of ways. It can be stated as a rule: 
Rule Formulation: Fornication is illegal. 
However, it can also be stated as an exception: 
Exception Formulation: Sex is legal, except sex outside 
marriage is illegal.47 
The same principle applies for tax statutes.48 For instance, I.R.C. § 121 
excludes from income gain on the sale of a principal residence up to 
$250,000.49 The exclusion is only available if the taxpayer has owned and used 
the property as a principal residence for at least 2 of the 5 years preceding the 
sale.50 The I.R.C. § 121 exclusion could be structured as a rule or an 
exception. 
Rule Formulation: If taxpayer owns and uses a property as 
a principal residence for 2 of last 5 years, then she may 
exclude gain on sale up to $250,000. 
Exception Formulation: A taxpayer may exclude up to 
$250,000 gain on the sale or exchange of her property, 
except that such exclusion is not available unless the 
 
 44. Frederick Schauer, Exceptions, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 871, 872 (1991).  
 45. Id. For an example of some of the follow-on work to Schauer, see, for example, Glanville 
Williams, The Logic of “Exceptions,” 47 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 261 (1988). 
 46. Schauer, supra note 44, at 878–79. 
 47. Or, alternatively: Sex is illegal, except sex with one’s spouse is legal. 
 48. Schauer examined this phenomenon generally, but claimed that existing language and 
societal understandings dictated whether an exception needed to be created or not. Schauer, 
supra note 44, at 872. Others suggested that an exception may do more. See, e.g., Claire Oakes 
Finkelstein, When the Rule Swallows the Exception, 19 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 505, 530–37 (2000); 
Jeremy B. Stein, Note, The Necessary Language of Exceptions: A Response to Frederick Schauer’s 
“Exceptions,” 63 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 99, 102 (2007).  
 49. I.R.C. § 121(b)(1) (2012). 
 50. Id. § 121(a). The rule is more complicated than this. For instance, the exclusion can be 
increased in the case of married taxpayers filing a joint return. Id. § 121(b)(2). If a taxpayer does 
not meet the 2 out of 5 year rule, under certain circumstances the taxpayer can qualify for a lesser 
exclusion. Id. § 121(c)(1). The point here, and elsewhere, is not to provide a comprehensive 
explanation of the tax law, but rather to highlight particular choices that are made in drafting a statute.   
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taxpayer has owned and used the property as a principal 
residence for 2 out of the last 5 years.51 
While the exception framing and the rule framing are equivalent, 
exception-based framing is pervasive in the Code. Even I.R.C. § 61, arguably 
the foundational section of the federal income tax, begins with an exception:  
(a) General Definition  
Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, gross income 
means all income from whatever source derived, including (but not 
limited to) the following items: 
[list of included items] . . . .52 
Many of the exceptions to gross income are contained elsewhere in the 
Code and themselves contain exceptions. For example, I.R.C. § 101, which 
creates an exception from gross income for certain life insurance proceeds, 
states that it is subject to a number of exceptions.53 Likewise, I.R.C. § 102(a) 
states that gross income does not include property acquired by gift or bequest, 
but creates an exception for employee gifts, which are not excluded from 
gross income by § 102(a).54 I.R.C. § 103 excludes interest from state and local 
bonds from gross income, but creates an exception for certain private activity 
bonds, arbitrage bonds, and bonds not in registered form.55 This pervasive 
use of exceptions may suggest that the practice is inevitable. However, as we 
explain next, all of these exception-drafted statutes could, as a matter of logic, 
instead be articulated as more narrowly tailored rules.  
2. Narrow Rules with Defined Terms vs. Broad General Rules  
with Large Exceptions  
An extension of the idea that any exception can also be formulated as a 
general rule is the idea that legal distinctions can be drafted using narrow 
rules with defined terms, or using broad general rules followed by large 
exceptions that may threaten to swallow the general rule.   
Exception-swallows-the-rule drafting occurs frequently in the Code: One 
example is I.R.C. § 163, which addresses the deductibility of interest. That 
statute states a broad general rule: “[t]here shall be allowed as a deduction all 
interest paid or accrued within the taxable year on indebtedness.”56 But, much 
farther down in the statute, it creates a large exception: § 163(h)(1) states that 
 
 51. Another possible exception framing is: “Gain from the sale or exchange of property is 
taxable, except that up to $250,000 of gain on the sale or exchange of property is not taxable if 
the taxpayer owns and uses the property as a principal residence for 2 of last 5 years.”  
 52. I.R.C. § 61(a).  
 53. Id. § 101(a)(2) (providing the transfer for valuable consideration exception). 
 54. Id. § 102. 
 55. Id. § 103. 
 56. Id. § 163. 
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“personal interest” is not deductible, thereby excepting personal interest from 
the ambit of the general rule.57 Making matters more complicated,  
§ 163(h)(2) then creates an exception to that exception: It defines “personal 
interest” to exclude certain items including, significantly, “qualified residence 
interest.”58 This is the basis for the home mortgage interest deduction.   
The entire disallowance of personal interest in §163(h) threatens to 
swallow the broad general rule in § 163(a) that all interest is deductible, and 
in fact substantially changes the principle stated in the general rule to the 
point where one wonders why the broad general rule was necessary. 
Moreover, the exception to the exception in § 163(h)(2) buries the intricate 
and important rules allowing home mortgage interest deductions deep within 
the statute.59  
The statute could, alternatively, be written using a much narrower rule 
that is circumscribed using a defined term, while achieving the same 
substantive outcome. For example:  
Narrow Rule: Approved Business Interest and Approved 
Personal Interest are deductible.   
Defined Term 1: Approved Business Interest includes ___.  
Defined Term 2: Approved Personal Interest includes ___.  
In short, rather than stating a broad general rule that all interest is deductible 
followed by large exceptions, the statute could have articulated a narrower 
rule stating that only certain “approved interest” is deductible, and then could 
have defined that term.  
Defined terms are thus a way for a statute, particularly a complex statute, 
to state a narrow rule without having to introduce an explicit exception to do 
the narrowing. Defined terms are especially important in a technical area like 
tax law. They allow the drafter to articulate narrowly circumscribed rules even 
if there is no broader social meaning to the terms used (as exists in the case 
of “fornication”).60 For example, the term “controlled foreign corporation” 
(“CFC”) or “applicable high yield discount obligation” are Code-made terms 
that would have little meaning to the outside world aside from the definitions 
in § 957 and § 163, respectively.61 But having been defined into existence, 
 
 57. Id. § 163(h)(1). The exception for personal interest is only one of the exceptions to 
I.R.C. § 163. For example, the 2017 tax reform introduced a new limitation on deductible 
business interest, which is another significant exception. Id. § 163(j). 
 58. Id. § 163(h)(2)(D). For the 2018 to 2025 tax years, the definition of “qualified 
residence interest” in I.R.C. § 163(h)(3) has been narrowed to exclude “home equity 
indebtedness” and to cap the amount of acquisition indebtedness upon which the mortgage 
interest deduction is allowable. Id. § 163(h)(3)(F). 
 59. Id. § 163(h)(2). 
 60. Cf. Schauer, supra note 44, at 878–80 (stating that the ability to craft general rules 
depends on existence of terms with underlying social meaning).  
 61. I.R.C. §§ 957(a), 163(i). 
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they allow the Code to draw distinctions (for example, between CFCs and non 
CFCs) without introducing an explicit exception. 
3. Free-Standing Provisions v. Intra-Section Drafting 
Statutes also vary in terms of where exceptions and defined terms are 
placed in relation to the main rules to which they relate, and in terms of how 
explicitly or implicitly they are cross-referenced. The Code sometimes places 
exceptions and defined terms in the same Code section as the main rule, but 
sometimes places them in different Code sections, and may do so with or 
without an explicit cross reference. 
i. Placement of Exceptions 
The Code’s varying approaches to placement of exceptions can be seen 
in the rules governing contributions of property to corporations and 
partnerships upon entity formation. These rules generally provide 
“[n]onrecognition” (i.e., tax free) treatment for such contributions.62 There 
are numerous exceptions to nonrecognition—that is, situations in which tax 
will in fact be imposed. It turns out that drafters have taken contrasting 
approaches to placement and cross-referencing of these exceptions in the 
corporate and partnership contexts. 
In the case of corporate contributions, exceptions to the general 
nonrecognition rule are contained in the same Code section as the general 
rule.63 The general rule providing that transfers of property to a controlled 
corporation are not taxable is in I.R.C. § 351(a).64 The exception to 
nonrecognition is contained in I.R.C. § 351, right after the § 351(a) general 
rule.65 I.R.C. § 351(b) describes at length circumstances in which property 
transfers to the corporation will be taxed, including in very specific 
circumstances (such as the receipt of “nonqualified preferred stock”).66 I.R.C. 
§ 351 is therefore an example of an exception explicitly written into the same 
Code section as the general rule. 
In contrast, the partnership contribution rules take a different approach. 
There is also a general nonrecognition rule for transfers of property to 
partnerships, I.R.C. § 721.67 But that section is short.68 Its general rule 
provides that “[n]o gain or loss shall be recognized to a partnership or to any 
of its partners in the case of a contribution of property to the partnership in 
exchange for an interest in the partnership.”69 While I.R.C. § 721 offers a few 
 
 62. See id. §§ 351, 721. 
 63. See, e.g., id. § 351. 
 64. Id. § 351(a).  
 65. Id. § 351(b). 
 66. Id. § 351.  
 67. Id. § 721.  
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. § 721(a).  
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within-section exceptions to this general rule, most of the significant 
exceptions to nonrecognition treatment (including what happens when the 
contributor receives cash or prohibited property in exchange for the property 
contributed) are left to other Code sections. Examples of such “free-standing” 
exceptions include the so-called “disguised sales” rules of I.R.C. § 707(a)(2)(B) 
and the rules regarding what happens when there is liability relief in excess 
of outside basis, which can yield gain recognition.70   
Not only are these free-standing exceptions to nonrecognition treatment 
not offered within the general rule of I.R.C. § 721, they also do not even refer 
to § 721, and § 721 does not refer to them. Instead, these other rules are 
presented in the Code as “independent rules.” In the case of liability relief in 
excess of outside basis (which produces a functional exception to § 721), the 
exception comes about through linkages between multiple, other rules, which 
themselves do not explicitly refer to each other.71  
In short, the partnership exceptions to nonrecognition treatment are far 
less apparent upon a casual glance than the exceptions in the corporate 
contribution context.   
ii. Placement of Defined Terms 
The same issue can arise for defined terms. Sometimes a Code section 
will offer its own definition for a term and may limit the definition to only that 
Code section. An example of such a section is I.R.C. § 108, which provides a 
tax exclusion for the income resulting from forgiveness of a taxpayer’s debt 
under certain conditions. I.R.C. § 108(d)(1) provides the definition of 
indebtedness of the taxpayer and limits its application to only § 108:  
For purposes of this section, the term “indebtedness of the taxpayer” 
means any indebtedness— 
 (A) for which the taxpayer is liable, or  
 (B) subject to which the taxpayer holds property.72 
Other Code provisions instead offer cross-referenced definitions, referring 
the taxpayer to another section of the Code. This occurs, for instance, in the 
corporate tax rules, which explicitly cross reference the definition of “control” 
of the corporation from one section (I.R.C. § 368(c)) to define control 
elsewhere, for example, in I.R.C. § 351, which addresses transfers to 
corporations controlled by the transferors.73 Among such Code provisions 
offering definitions by cross reference, some might borrow the definition 
from elsewhere unchanged, but others may modify or impose substituted 
language when employing the cross-referenced definition. For example, 
 
 70. Id. §§ 707(a)(2)(B), 731(a), 752(b).  
 71. See id. §§ 731, 752(b).  
 72. Id. § 108(d)(1).  
 73. Id. § 351(a).  
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I.R.C. § 304 (pertaining to redemptions through related corporations) 
employs a cross reference to the attribution rules of I.R.C. § 318 but 
substitutes “5%” for the 50% thresholds appearing in I.R.C. § 318.74  
I.R.C. § 199A cross-references I.R.C. § 1202(e)(3)(A) in defining the term 
“specified service trade or business” but notes that that section should be 
“applied without regard to the words ‘engineering, architecture.’”75 
Still other Code provisions use terms that are defined in a “catch-all” 
Code section that contains defined terms—I.R.C. § 7701. Section 7701 states:  
When used in this title, where not otherwise distinctly expressed or 
manifestly incompatible with the intent thereof— 
[list of defined terms].76 
“Title” refers to all of Title 26, the entire Internal Revenue Code. Thus, a 
drafter may decide to insert a new defined term into I.R.C. § 7701 that applies 
broadly to all of Title 26 unless “otherwise distinctly expressed or manifestly 
incompatible with the intent.”77 A drafter may also rely on the existing  
I.R.C. § 7701 definitions in drafting new statutes.  
Note that some provisions of the Code use terms that could be defined 
terms, but they are either not defined at all, or a stated definition elsewhere 
in the Code does not apply to a given use of the term. An example of a term 
that is never defined is the term “trade or business,” which occurs in several 
places throughout the Code without a definition.78 An example of a term that 
has a stated definition that is not applicable to all uses of the term in the Code 
is the I.R.C. § 61 definition of gross income. I.R.C. § 61 lists “[i]ncome from 
discharge of indebtedness” as one of the items that is explicitly included in 
income.79 While “income from discharge of indebtedness” also occurs in and 
is defined in I.R.C. § 108(d)(1), the § 108 definition expressly only applies 
“[f]or purposes of this section [i.e., section 108]” itself.80 And § 61 provides 
no alternative definition, either in § 61 itself or by cross reference. Therefore, 
the term as used in § 61 remains undefined.  
4. Drafting Features in Combination 
Finally, it is important to note that often all of these features interact and 
occur in combination. Take for example I.R.C. § 82, pertaining to 
reimbursement of moving expenses, which states: 
 
 74. Id. §§ 304(c)(3), 318(a)(2)(C). 
 75. Id. § 199A(d). 
 76. Id. § 7701. 
 77. Id. 
 78. See, e.g., id. § 162. 
 79. Id. § 61.  
 80. Id. § 108(d)(1).  
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Except as provided in section 132(a)(6) [pertaining to “qualified 
moving expense reimbursement[s]”], there shall be included in 
gross income (as compensation for services) any amount received or 
accrued, directly or indirectly, by an individual as a payment for or 
reimbursement of expenses of moving from one residence to 
another residence which is attributable to employment or self-
employment.81 
This is an example of an explicit exception from gross income inclusion that 
is created by cross-reference to a defined term. The defined term contained in  
§ 132(a)(6) (“qualified moving expense reimbursement”) is itself part of 
another substantive Code exception to gross income: If the reimbursement is 
a “qualified moving expense reimbursement” then it is excluded from gross 
income as a § 132 fringe benefit.82 Here, the choices we have discussed work 
in combination, and certain of such choices made in combination may make 
the statute particularly difficult to parse.  
C. DO DRAFTING CHOICES MATTER? 
Understanding the array of drafting choices that confront the statutory 
drafter begs the question: Do these choices matter? Should we care whether 
drafters write broad general rules paired with exceptions as opposed to 
narrow rules using defined terms? Should we care where they place such 
exceptions or defined terms in the Code, or whether they use explicit as 
opposed to implicit cross references? Or, are such drafting choices irrelevant 
as long as the statutes accurately convey the intended law?  
One possible answer to this question is that these choices do not matter 
because the substantive law is the same and will have the same impact 
regardless of how the statute is formulated. However, it is also possible that 
even if the substantive content of the statute is unchanged, drafting choices 
may have some important effects. The potential importance of drafting 
choices can be illustrated via metaphorical comparison to the decision 
regarding placement of bathrooms in a building. Clearly, the number of 
bathrooms in a building (a decision about content) is important—the 
number of bathrooms in a concert hall, for example, will affect how many 
people can go to the bathroom and how long they have to wait. But the 
decisions about where and how to place and design bathrooms are also 
important. Whether bathrooms are placed next to a ramp on the first floor or 
at the top of a steep set of stairs tucked in a back corner, whether bathrooms 
are well lit, and whether they have appropriate signage, can all affect how 
people actually find, use, and experience the bathrooms. Bathroom 
placement also affects perceptions of whether the concert hall is handicapped 
 
 81. Id. § 82. The 2017 tax reform suspends this exclusion for years 2018–2025. H.R. Rep. 
No. 115-466, at 278–77 (2017). 
 82. I.R.C. § 132.  
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accessible and is generally an appealing place to see a concert. Likewise, how 
tax statutes are formulated can affect accessibility and how various parties 
(including lawyers, the government, courts, and policy makers) interact with 
the law, thereby influencing the law’s impact. 
We now outline some potential impacts of drafting choices. This 
discussion does not necessarily prove that drafting choices do matter or 
quantify the extent to which any particular drafting decision matters. 
However, examining the ways drafting choices may matter does help sharpen 
our inquiry into what counsels are thinking about when they draft. 
Specifically, if counsels are operating under the hypothesis that drafting 
choices are irrelevant, it would be important to understand why they think 
this, in light of the possible effects that we outline below.83 Alternatively, if 
counsels do consider drafting choices to be significant, it would be important 
to understand which consequences they regard as most important, which ones 
they had not considered, and why. 
1. Effects on Taxpayers, Representatives, and Government 
Certain drafting choices can make the statute difficult to interpret 
accurately. For example, a spiral of exceptions to exceptions to exceptions 
can be quite difficult to read. Placement of an exception to a general rule in 
a distant Code provision may cause readers to miss the exception and may 
invite interpretive errors.84 In contrast, narrowly tailored general rules or a 
general rule followed by exceptions within the same section may be more 
intuitive for the reader.   
While perhaps such differences may matter less for sophisticated tax 
experts who are deeply familiar with the Code,85 certain choices make the law 
significantly more costly to some users. For example, less sophisticated users 
of the Code (including new lawyers and lawyers in smaller generalist law 
practices that provide some tax services) may find convoluted statutory 
language or hidden exceptions difficult to comprehend, interpret, or 
 
 83. See Lee Anne Fennell & Richard H. McAdams, Inversion Aversion, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 1–2) (discussing how sometimes the value of foundational 
theories is as a foil). 
 84. Cf. GAIL LEVIN RICHMOND, FEDERAL TAX RESEARCH 47 (9th ed. 2014) (explaining that 
related sections referring to each other “is the ideal situation,” whereas the “worst-case scenario” 
is when neither related section refers to the other). 
 85. It is not clear that even experts are immune to convolution in a Code. While experts are 
perhaps in a better position to digest more convoluted statutory language due to training or 
experience, convoluted language is nonetheless likely to be more costly and difficult to parse, 
relative to simpler alternatives. Experts are also not immune to cognitive biases that may result 
from different drafting choices. See, e.g., Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism 
Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 661 (1999) (explaining that 
“when the pertinent events are not easily predictable and the feedback is not unambiguous, 
experts tend to be even more overconfident than laypersons”).   
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detect.86 This can cause errors, create barriers to entry, and make tax advice 
more costly for taxpayers. Anecdotal evidence from the tax bar suggests that 
it takes longer for new tax lawyers to get up to speed on tax law, due in part 
to the increasing length and complexity of the tax law. This can result in a 
small pool of experts.87 And one can expect costs to taxpayers to be high if 
the pool of available experts is small. 
A system in which taxpayers must rely on experts to read the Code may 
also create additional costs for the government, because the government must 
rely on lawyers and advisors to help taxpayers navigate the tax law. Additional 
costs may arise, for example, if lawyers and tax advisors take aggressive pro-
taxpayer interpretations, which may decrease revenues collected and shift the 
burden of detecting these positions to the government.88 Such costs may arise 
if companies that write tax software misunderstand, misinterpret, or mis-
implement the law. Such errors in software algorithms and programming may 
be difficult for tax policymakers to detect and correct.  
Moreover, as the Code gets harder to read, government agencies may 
have to play a bigger role in translating the Code for taxpayers.89 Depending 
on how a statute is worded, the gulf between the statutory language and IRS 
guidance language (such as FAQs, Forms, and Instructions on the website) 
may be small or large. The larger the gulf, the more work the IRS will have to 
do, and the more discretion it will have to interpret, translate, or simplify the 
law.90  
 
 86. BARBARA H. KARLIN, TAX RESEARCH 63, 65–67 (4th ed. 2008) (explaining that 
“[l]earning to read and interpret the [Code] is definitely a formidable challenge” and exploring 
the more intensive search processes new users of the Code should use, relative to the quicker 
processes that experienced users can rely upon); RICHMOND, supra note 84, at 48 (exploring how 
differing levels of knowledge of the Code require different types of searches in order to find issues 
like hidden connections between different provisions).  
 87. For example, the growing use of pass-through entities in domestic and cross-border tax 
planning since the issuance of the “check-the-box” regulations in 1997 has meant that 
understanding the partnership provisions of the Tax Code has become increasingly important 
for tax lawyers. But the partnership provisions are exceedingly complex, with the result that the 
group of lawyers with expertise in partnership law is small. See, e.g., Andrea Monroe, Hidden in 
Plain Sight: IRS Publications and a New Path to Tax Reform, 21 FLA. TAX REV. 81, 126–27 (2017) 
(describing both prevalence and complexity of tax partnerships).  
 88. Evidence regarding the impact of professional preparers on compliance is mixed. Some 
studies have found a correlation between professional preparers and lower compliance. Brian 
Erard, Taxation with Representation: An Analysis of the Role of Tax Practitioners in Tax Compliance,  
52 J. PUB. ECON. 163, 194 (1993). Other studies have found that professional preparers reduce 
compliance when there is legal ambiguity, but increase compliance when the law is clear. Steven 
Klepper & Daniel Nagin, The Role of Tax Preparers in Tax Compliance, 22 POL’Y SCI. 167, 168 (1989).   
 89. Joshua D. Blank & Leigh Osofsky, Simplexity: Plain Language and the Tax Law, 66 EMORY 
L.J. 189, 192 (2017).  
 90. See id. at 238–41.   
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2. Effects on Judicial Interpretations 
How a statute is formulated may have consequences for judicial 
interpretation. When courts engage in statutory interpretation, they are, of 
course, engaging in interpretation of the statutory text, even if this is only an 
entry point into a more holistic or purposive interpretation.91 The fact that 
courts focus on the text on the page and apply various interpretive canons in 
construing statutory text means that the formulation choice for identical 
substantive legal content can matter in judicial outcomes, even in cases where 
the statutory content is the same as a matter of logic. 
For instance, at least some courts discount examples as incapable of 
offering dispositive law, even though examples may in effect offer the same 
substantive content that can be formulated as a rule.92 Thus, the choice to 
formulate substantive content in the form of an example, rather than a 
seemingly identical rule, may impact a court’s treatment of the same legal 
content.   
To take another example of the impact of drafting choices, the 
interpretive canon expressio unius provides that inclusion of one thing implies 
the exclusion of another.93 So, for instance, a list of “any tree, bush, or shrub” 
may be interpreted to exclude potted plants. This canon could mean that 
using a general rule followed by a list of exceptions may imply an exclusion of 
other exceptions, in a way that other formulations may not.   
3. Consequences for Tax Law’s Development 
The way the statute is formulated may also create intended or 
unintended presumptions and effects as law develops. For example, a statute 
drafted as a broad general rule followed by exceptions creates a presumption 
that items not explicitly excepted are included in the general rule. This may 
yield more widespread inclusion of items in the general rule over time than a 
“narrower rule” formulation, for example if new situations and categories 
arise over time that the listed exceptions did not contemplate.  
Take, for instance, the definition of “capital asset” in the Code. The Code 
provision that defines a capital asset provides that “the term ‘capital asset’ 
means property held by the taxpayer (whether or not connected with his trade 
or business), but does not include [a series of listed exceptions].”94 This 
definition of a capital asset as “all property” followed by delineated exceptions 
means that, as new types of assets arise that the original drafters may not have 
contemplated, such assets are presumptively capital assets (because they do 
 
 91. See Victoria F. Nourse, A Decision Theory of Statutory Interpretation: Legislative History by the 
Rules, 122 YALE L.J. 70, 90 (2012) (“Purposivists begin with text, and textualists look to text to 
find purpose.”).   
 92. See Susan C. Morse & Leigh Osofsky, Regulating by Example, 35 YALE  J. ON REG. 127, 137 (2018).  
 93. United States v. Barnes, 222 U.S. 513, 518 (1912).  
 94. I.R.C. § 1221 (2012). 
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not fall within the delineated exceptions). In contrast, the new type of asset 
would not presumptively qualify as a capital asset if the rule were drafted as a 
narrower general rule that affirmatively provided the specific assets that 
qualify as capital assets.  
On the flip side, it is also possible that a statute drafted as a general rule 
followed by a list of exceptions—or really any statute that delineates lists of 
items that fall within a certain category—may make it easier from a political 
process perspective for additional exceptions to be added to the list over 
time.95 It is possible that tax policymakers and drafters may find it easier to 
insert new exceptions than to unwind a narrowly tailored specific rule. 
4. Framing Effects on Policy Debates 
The way the tax law is articulated may also exert a framing influence on 
tax policy myths and debates. As Frederick Schauer has noted, the choice to 
formulate something as an exception may be purposefully done in order to 
characterize one position as socially dominant and conversely to cast the 
exception as the “outsider.”96 This insight is applicable in the context of tax 
statutes: For example, a broadly articulated rule that “all income is taxable” 
reads like an income tax and creates the impression that income is the current 
and normatively desirable tax base, even if it is then riddled with exceptions. 
Such a rule can obscure the consumption-like features of existing law and may 
affect debates over the choice of tax base.97 
In addition, an ugly, unwieldy, or verbose Code may provide fodder for 
those who might complain about the Code’s complexity and who might 
suggest that the Code is “broken.”98 Complexity, of course, has multiple 
dimensions, and complexity of the drafted word is only one dimension.99 
However, at least some charges of complexity stem from how the rules are 
formulated and the length of the Code, both of which result in part from 
drafting choices.   
 
 95. For example, I.R.C. § 62, which defines “adjusted gross income,” contains a list of “above 
the line” deductions (deductions that can be taken in addition to the standardized deduction in 
computing gross income), a list that has grown over time. 
 96. See generally Schauer, supra note 44 (discussing the role the exception has played in our 
legal system). 
 97. See Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 YALE L.J. 451, 513–22 
(2004) (exploring how the defined contribution retirement paradigm has made the Code a 
consumption tax for middle-class taxpayers). See generally Andrews, supra note 17 (making the 
case for a consumption tax). 
 98. Joseph Bishop-Henchman, How Many Words Are in the Tax Code?, TAX FOUND. (Apr. 15, 
2014), https://taxfoundation.org/how-many-words-are-tax-code; Scott Greenberg, Federal Tax 
Laws and Regulations Are Now over 10 Million Words Long, TAX FOUND. (Oct. 8, 2015), 
https://taxfoundation.org/federal-tax-laws-and-regulations-are-now-over-10-million-words-long.  
 99. See, e.g., DAVID F. BRADFORD, UNTANGLING THE INCOME TAX 266–67 (1986) (exploring 
different types of tax law complexity).  
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In short, substantive content aside, these are a variety of ways in which 
the way the content is formulated may potentially matter. Again, the above 
discussion is not meant to definitively prove that formulation choices matter 
or why they matter. Rather, the point is to identify various potential effects, 
and to examine the extent to which government counsels consider these 
effects (and others) in creating and drafting tax legislation. 
III. INTERVIEWS WITH GOVERNMENT COUNSELS 
We turn in this Part to the findings of interviews we conducted with 
current and former government counsels who participated in the tax 
legislation drafting process over the past four decades. Our goal was to 
understand (1) how those involved in the creation of tax legislation actually 
made drafting choices in formulating statutory language, and (2) to what 
extent they viewed these choices as significant. We outline our methodology 
and then report our findings.   
A. METHODOLOGY 
In identifying the pool of interviewees, we started with current and 
former counsels in the tax field we were able to identify and then employed a 
purposeful sampling technique called “snowball sampling” or “referral 
sampling.”100 That is, we first identified interview subjects who obviously met 
the criteria for our study (e.g., former counsels who had been involved in the 
tax legislation drafting process) and interviewed them. We located these 
individuals via internet and other research, which yielded names of counsels 
who had occupied key positions in important tax writing committees and 
other offices over time. We then requested referrals from the subjects we 
interviewed to identify additional subjects.  
Because the interviewee population is former or current government 
employees and officials, and the activity being studied (i.e., legislative 
drafting) was not embarrassing or ethically questionable, we considered it 
acceptable to ask for suggestions regarding additional potential subjects 
directly (i.e., by asking for names). In fact, the subjects we interviewed would 
often spontaneously volunteer names of other subjects they thought we 
should speak with without us having to ask. A minority of interview subjects 
chose to contact other potential subjects to request their consent before 
passing their contact information on to us. In a few cases, subjects expressed 
strong opinions regarding other potential interviewees who we should 
absolutely talk to about drafting. In many cases, we were able to locate and 
contact additional subjects using publicly available email addresses. In some 
cases, we asked those we interviewed to provide us contact information of the 
 
 100. See SHARAN B. MERRIAM & ELIZABETH J. TISDELL, QUALITATIVE RESEARCH: A GUIDE TO 
DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION 98 (4th ed. 2015) (describing snowball sampling as using early 
participants to refer other participants). 
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individuals they had referred to us. There were some suggested subjects for 
whom we were unable to locate contact information. 
1. Interview Subjects  
We sent solicitation emails to 45 current and former counsels and staff 
who have had involvement in the tax legislation drafting process. We received 
31 responses, with five declining to be interviewed.  
The counsels and staff we spoke to included individuals who had worked 
on the Joint Committee on Taxation, the Senate Finance Committee, the 
House Ways and Means Committee, the Department of Treasury, the IRS, 
Senate Legislative Counsel, and counsels to individual Congress Members.101 
Interview subjects were almost evenly split between those who had been 
involved with the legislative drafting process during or before the enactment 
of the 1986 Code (the last major tax reform before the 2017 changes), and 
those who only became involved in subsequent years. The length of 
involvement among interview subjects varied widely. Because of the relatively 
small pool of individuals interviewed, we are constrained in our ability to 
provide specific numerical breakdowns by committees, years of service, 
political affiliation, or other criteria due to confidentiality considerations. 
2. Size of Pool and Representativeness  
The pool of tax counsels we spoke to is small, but the range of individuals 
we spoke to was broad enough to provide a well-textured sense of drafting 
choices and practices.102 Our goal was to understand how drafting choices 
were made across time to produce the Code. In light of our research question, 
we attempted to speak with counsels who had served over different periods of 
time and in various capacities. By using qualitative interviews, we were able to 
have extensive discussions with our interviewees about various aspects of 
drafting.  
3. Interview Approach  
We conducted semi-structured phone interviews with those individuals 
who responded to our email and expressed willingness to be interviewed. This 
meant that we approached the interviews with a prepared list of questions, but 
 
 101. Although almost every person we interviewed was a lawyer, some were not.   
 102. By way of comparison, in Gluck and Bressman’s study of statutory interpretation, in 
which they interviewed counsels with responsibility for legislative drafting working across all areas 
of legislation (not just tax), the researchers conducted surveys of 137 counsels (out of a maximum 
possible 650). See generally Gluck & Bressman I, supra note 8 (explaining the method used in 
Gluck and Bressman’s study). Shobe’s study of intertemporal statutory interpretation included 
seven interviews of congressional staff, confirming research, and Shobe’s experience as an intern 
for a period in the Office of Legislative Counsel. Shobe, supra note 8, at 817–18. Nourse and 
Schacter’s study regarding statutory drafting included interviews with 16 staffers on the Senate 
Judiciary Committee and two lawyers from Senate Legislative Counsel. Nourse & Schacter, supra 
note 8, at 578–79.   
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we added additional questions and also skipped questions as appropriate. Our 
initial list of questions is attached in the Appendix. Interviews lasted between 
approximately 40 minutes to an hour and a half. 
The semi-structured approach allowed us to tailor our interview 
questions to take into account that individual’s experience and familiarity 
with the tax legislation drafting process. For example, if an interview subject 
mentioned early in an interview that the individual had high-level managerial 
experience with drafting, rather than day-to-day experience with particular 
provisions, we might focus on questions about the general drafting process 
and responsibilities.  
Interviewees sometimes spoke at length about various aspects of the 
legislative drafting process. In such instances, we allowed the conversation to 
flow naturally, rather than forcing the conversation back to the interview 
script. Because of this semi-structured approach, we were able to obtain 
insights into the drafting process that were unexpected, did not directly 
reflect the questions we asked, or illuminated aspects of drafting that we had 
not previously considered.  
4. Limitations  
Our research methodology yielded a wealth of information regarding 
how counsels approached the process of creating tax legislation. However, 
our methodology was also subject to important limitations. First, the snowball 
or referral sampling approach may yield a sample in which subjects refer the 
researchers to others who share their opinions or whom they know well.103 
This means there is no guarantee of representativeness, and the sample may 
be biased. In addition, we had no way of preventing our interview subjects 
from discussing the interviews with each other. If this happened, it had the 
potential to affect the answers we received. On the flip side, the pool of tax 
counsels involved with the legislation drafting process is relatively small and 
largely known to each other, so snowball sampling was an effective way to 
reach this relatively contained target population.  
Second, because the number of interview subjects was small, we are 
constrained in how we report our results due to research ethics and the 
interests of maximizing confidentiality. For example, we do not identify the 
years during which each interviewee was involved with legislative drafting or 
the committees they served on because doing so risks identifying the research 
subjects. Similarly, we do not report quotations that run a significant risk of 
identifying the interviewee.  
Third, because many current counsels and staffers were busy working on 
tax reform in the fall of 2017, this may have decreased the response rate to 
our solicitation email. It may also mean that we have a disproportionate 
 
 103. MERRIAM & TISDELL, supra note 100, at 97–98.  
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number of declines or non-responses from Republican counsels and other 
counsels who were working on the 2017 legislative reform proposals.  
Fourth, House Legislative Counsel declined our interview requests, citing 
confidentiality restrictions. Thus, we were not able to speak with Legislative 
Counsel in the House Office of Legislative Counsel.  
Fifth, in many cases there was some time lag between the interviewee’s 
participation in the legislative process and the time of the interview. This was 
particularly so for counsels active in or prior to the 1980s. This means that 
interview responses may be limited by human memory. It is possible that the 
passage of time may influence how certain interviewees recall and describe 
their experiences and approaches. 
 We must note a final methodological point. In our findings, we report 
interviewee responses regarding the significance (or lack thereof) of certain 
drafting choices. However, these responses cannot definitively prove or 
disprove the impacts of drafting choices on taxpayer behavior, tax policy 
debates, the law’s trajectory, or judicial decision-making. A different type of 
research would be required to prove the actual effects of drafting choices on 
various actors and constituencies.  
B. FINDINGS 
Our interviews yielded significant information regarding how counsels 
and others involved in the tax legislative process made choices regarding 
drafting, and how they regarded the significance of such choices. The 
interviews also shed light on other aspects of tax drafting, such as how 
statutory language accretes over time, who controls the drafting process, and 
how that process has changed.  
1. Audience 
i. Majority View: Drafting Choices Do Not Matter; Ordinary Taxpayers  
Are Not the Audience 
When asked whether drafting choices matter, a majority of interviewees 
responded that they did not pay much attention to drafting choices and that 
they did not really matter.104 This may be our most surprising finding. While 
we set out to understand what motivated drafters to make certain choices 
(such as the use of a general rule followed by an exception, rather than a more 
 
 104. See, e.g., Anonymous Interview Collection, Interviewee 3 (on file with author) (“I didn’t 
think that it mattered that much whether a lay person turned to the Code [and] what the 
provisions looked like. I didn’t think that was going to deter the audience.”); id. Interviewee 12 
(“I’ve never thought about it. I don’t know why things are drafted one way one time and another 
way another time.”); id. Interviewee 20 (“I would say that as I can remember we gave very little 
thought to questions like that [i.e., questions like whether to use broad general rule followed by 
exceptions or whether to use cross references or defined terms]. . . . I don’t remember 
consciously thinking about that at all.”); id. Interviewee 21 (“I think those decisions are largely 
by House Legislative Counsel and are not important.”). 
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narrowly tailored general rule), it was somewhat difficult to get our 
interviewees to discuss what might motivate such a choice. By and large, they 
simply had not paid much attention to these types of drafting choices and 
were not particularly interested in talking about them (though they did 
explain that choices tended to be motivated by a desire to preserve existing 
language and follow existing patterns in the Code, discussed in more detail in 
Section III.B.2.i below). Putting aside any path-dependent reasons for 
drafting choices, our interviewees generally had few thoughts on what might 
motivate one choice over another, or the implications of such choices. 
Part of what seemed to underpin this view was drafters’ perceived 
audience for tax statutes. One of the questions we specifically asked 
interviewees was who the intended audience was when drafting tax statutes. 
We received a variety of responses to this question. A view commonly 
expressed was that tax statutes are not drafted for the ordinary taxpayer; 
therefore, it did not matter whether statutes were convoluted because 
ordinary taxpayers would not be reading the statute. In fact, almost no 
interviewees indicated that they were drafting for taxpayers themselves (other 
than very sophisticated taxpayers and their tax counsel). Taxpayers, we were 
told, would not be reading the tax law from tax statutes. Some interviewees 
specifically indicated that it did not matter if the statute itself was complex 
because ordinary taxpayers who used TurboTax or an accountant would not 
experience that statutory language complexity.105  
Many interviewees emphasized the fact that the underlying goal in 
drafting tax legislation was to effectuate the intent of the Members of 
Congress. As discussed below, however, the overwhelming view among 
interviewees was that Members did not pay much attention to reading the 
statutory language. Having said that, however, interviewees had a variety of 
other constituencies in mind when drafting statutes. 
Some interviewees said they were drafting with the Treasury Department 
in mind, crafting statutes so that it would be possible for Treasury to effectively 
write regulations implementing the statute. Some thought that the IRS was an 
important audience—they were drafting statutes in a way that allowed the IRS 
to administer the law, write forms and instructions, etc. Others opined that 
sophisticated tax counsel, who had expertise in reading and interpreting the 
rules and advising clients, is the primary audience. A couple of interviewees 
 
 105. See, e.g., id. Interviewee 21 (“[W]e as a staff wanted to make life easier for taxpayers. . . . So 
we created a whole regime . . . that was really complicated, no member of Congress would 
understand what we’re doing and what the words meant. But the end user, the taxpayer, had 
their lives simplified immensely. They got a number from [a third party], they put the number 
on the return, and then went to sleep. Or they imported stuff from TurboTax. . . . Yes, there’s a 
level of complexity to the actual statute, and that complexity is necessary in often cases. . . . And 
the real question, though, is how can that complexity be translated in a way so that the end user, 
the taxpayer, can complete the return and comply without going through undue expenditures 
and efforts, and confusion.”). 
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indicated that the primary goal was to articulate a statute so that software 
companies such as TurboTax could effectively write a program that 
implemented the rule that a large number of taxpayers could use. One 
interviewee suggested that an important audience in the drafting process was 
their peer group—similarly positioned tax professionals, including both other 
drafters and tax experts in private industry. Such individuals would be 
evaluating a particular drafter’s expertise, acumen, and, perhaps, future 
employability, so one wanted to appear smart and competent to these tax 
professionals. Yet another stated that drafting was “inward focused,” staffers 
“are writing for themselves” and that “[t]he audience is that little group of 
people who actually read the stuff and then explain it to the Members.”106  
But, as noted, the answer that we almost did not hear at all was that those 
involved in the drafting process were drafting for taxpayers themselves. 
Indeed, a few interviewees felt very strongly that the tax law was not meant to 
be understood by the average taxpayer and that charges that the face of the 
statute was too complex or convoluted were unjustified for that reason. 
Likewise, although interviewees occasionally mentioned that they had 
courts in mind during the drafting process, this was not a dominant focus.107 
To the extent judicial interpretation was mentioned, the focus was on how 
prior judicial interpretations served as an incentive for drafters to retain 
existing statutory language because taxpayers had relied on court rulings 
interpreting it. On the other hand, potential future interpretations of statutory 
language and judicial doctrines appeared not to be at the forefront of 
interviewees’ minds. One interviewee stated, in response to our questions 
about audience:  
Not courts. Forget the courts. Forget the courts don’t matter. 
Remember maybe ninety percent of tax law, the courts don’t matter. 
The IRS doesn’t matter. What matters is millions of people are 
relying on what’s in that Code. Like as it has been interpreted by 
millions of interpreters, whether they were accountants or whatever, 
and a usage evolves. If you disturbed that, you are disturbing a whole 
lot of things that may never get to court. It’s just tax, the 
administration and the operation of the tax system is absolutely an 
iceberg. We spent all of our time worrying about the tip that is above 
the water. So in order of priority, the most important parts of the tax 
system once a bill is a bill, it starts with the IRS. This is what they put 
in their publications. Single most important thing and number one 
is what is in the form. Number two is what is in the publication that 
 
 106. Id. Interviewee 13. 
 107. This was consistent with Gluck and Bressman’s finding that counsels in their study 
generally did not intend for courts to be their interpretive partners. Gluck & Bressman II, supra 
note 8, at 765–77; see also Nourse & Schacter, supra note 8, at 600 (finding lack of attention by 
counsels to courts’ interpretive methods); Shobe, supra note 8, at 831 (finding the same).  
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is explaining the form. At that point, the public is relying on that. 
Everything after that in terms of what affects economic behavior is 
vastly less important. It’s the most important thing in a tax system 
from administration of course is how do people file their return? 
The penalties only affect a few people. Court cases affect even fewer 
people. Everything else is what are you doing that affects what goes 
on the return . . . . I am never worried about what the court will do 
as a practice. I am overstating it, but I just don’t think that’s 
important.108 
In other words, what was important was how taxpayers interfaced with the tax 
system through the forms and publications put out by the IRS and through 
other interpreters. It did not really matter how courts would interpret the tax 
law because challenges rarely reach the courts. Another interviewee noted 
that he felt that, in retrospect, he should have paid more attention to potential 
judicial interpretation than he actually did.109 
Notably, despite being able to point to various audiences for tax statutes 
other than taxpayers (e.g., Treasury, tax experts, TurboTax, IRS), most 
interviewees did not seem to think that drafting choices mattered a great deal 
for these constituencies. For example, most interviewees seemed to assume 
that experts would be able to understand, analyze, and advise taxpayers 
accurately despite drafting choices in the Code that might make interpreting 
the law non-obvious (such as free-standing exceptions or numerous cross 
references). Some of the interviewees who indicated that Treasury and IRS 
were a primary audience for statutory drafters did indicate that tax legislation 
containing explicit statements of statutory purpose or explicit delegations of 
authority would be helpful for regulation writers. In general, however, 
interviewees did not consider the types of drafting choices we mentioned 
during our interviews to be very important for the target audiences they 
identified. As discussed further below, several interviewees attributed drafting 
choices—for example, the choice to use exceptions paired with general rules 
or to use defined terms—to the particular unique “style” of drafting that 
drafters in the House and Senate Offices of Legislative Counsel used.110  
ii. Minority View: Drafting Choices Matter 
A minority of interviewees indicated that drafting choices do matter. One 
suggested that formulation decisions might matter for purposes of how the 
legislation is scored. That interviewee indicated that perhaps articulating a 
broadly inclusive general rule followed by an exception might enable the 
 
 108. Anonymous Interview Collection, supra note 104, Interviewee 7. 
 109. Id. Interviewee 20.  
 110. For discussion, see infra Section III.B.3. 
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legislation to get a better score from the Joint Committee on Taxation.111 This 
was a political process effect that we had not thought about. 
Other interviewees noted that drafting choices may matter for reasons 
that we had discussed in Section II.C. For instance, one interviewee suggested 
that the way that the law was formulated had significant impacts on the 
public’s ability to read and interact with the tax law. The interviewee suggested 
that there are potential problems with Legislative Counsel’s formulation 
decisions being left somewhat unchecked and unmonitored. Another 
interviewee thought that placing exceptions in a free-standing Code provision 
separate from the generally applicable rule was an obvious error. That 
interviewee also opined that the way a statutory rule is articulated might affect 
how a court might interpret that language. Another raised the possibility that 
poor drafting might give credence to arguments that the Code is too long and 
complex and that the Code is broken and needs to be overhauled and 
simplified, noting:  
[A]nything that makes people think [the Code] is crazy [matters 
and] . . . every time you [do] something screwy in the Code, and 
people can show, ‘Look how convoluted this is. This . . . over there 
really is associated with this thing over here,’ yes, it matters. It’s just 
another nail in the coffin of, ‘We have to do reform, but things are 
crazy, there’s too much of it, and we need to simplify it.’ Yeah, it does 
matter—it matters less than the policy that is implemented matter. 
But is it yet another [factor].112 
Another interviewee thought that drafting style might matter for consistency 
and effects on judicial interpretation. Yet another noted that starting with a 
general rule followed by exceptions provided clarity and discipline to the 
Code. But these perspectives were in the minority among the interviewees we 
surveyed. 
2. Change Over Time; Time Pressures 
Interviewees also pointed to several dynamics of legislative drafting as 
responsible for the way that the tax law is actually formulated. Two dynamics 
often mentioned were (1) the accretion of statutory language over time, and 
(2) limitations drafters faced in how much they can change existing statutory 
language. In addition, several interviewees noted that legislation drafters face 
significant time pressure while drafting tax legislation that could affect the 
statutory language. 
 
 111. See Yin, supra note 8 (manuscript at 46 & n.240) (noting designation of JCT as official 
scorekeeper beginning in 1974). See generally Pearlman, supra note 8 (discussing major tax 
legislative developments from 1972 to 1992). 
 112. Anonymous Interview Collection, supra note 104, Interviewee 22. 
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i. Accretion Over Time and Stickiness 
When asked about why tax statutes are sometimes drafted such that 
exceptions swallow the general rule, or why the Code contains seemingly 
independent exceptions contained in free-standing Code provisions with no 
obvious cross reference, many interviewees suggested that the way the tax law 
appears now is an artifact of how the law came to be over time. The original 
drafters of the law may have crafted a general rule while not appreciating the 
complexity or full extent of the problem. Alternatively, subsequent legislators 
may have wanted to change the statutory rule. Either situation might 
necessitate amendments in the future. Any such amendments would tend to 
be addressed with additional provisions that are layered onto the original 
statute, rather than a wholesale rewrite of the original rule.  
Interviewees specifically noted that drafters tend not to reformulate the 
original rule due to an interest in making the minimum number of changes 
necessary. The result would be a complicated and difficult to read statutory 
edifice. Interviewees gave various reasons for why drafters tend to make the 
minimum possible changes to an old provision. One reason was that the 
existing Code provision would have created various, settled expectations, 
reliance, and interpretations. For example, court cases would already have 
interpreted existing statutory language; regulations may have been written 
interpreting or implementing a statutory provision; tax lawyers would have 
invested hours in learning, interpreting, and researching statutory language; 
and new Code sections may have sprung up that cross-referenced other Code 
sections or relied on definitions elsewhere in the Code.113 One interviewee 
suggested that if a certain Code section uses a defined term, that Code section 
is much more likely to be used later on by other sections than a Code section 
that did not contain a defined term. Drafters would make small tweaks to the 
statutory language, rather than engaging in wholesale statutory overhaul or 
reformulation, to try to avoid unsettling these existing interpretations, cross-
references, accumulated bar knowledge, and regulatory interpretations.  
Relatedly, other interviewees suggested that the nature of the tax 
legislative process means that agreement can often be reached to make small 
tweaks, but that a broader reformulation (even if the purpose was just 
clarification) would require more extensive legislative buy-in, which is costly 
and more difficult to obtain. One of the questions we asked interviewees was 
whether it would be possible to simply clean up parts of the Code that had 
accreted over time (without making substantive changes). In response, 
interviewees routinely suggested that cleaning up the Code just to make it 
 
 113. See, e.g., id. Interviewee 7 (“You are having everybody change all of their systems that for 
one reason or another have relied on words that were used before. So you just don’t do that 
unless you have a very strong reason. You don’t do it just to improve marginally. You have to 
[have] an overriding reason to change wording that has been in the Code for a long time in some 
structural way.”). 
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clearer was difficult or impossible because of underlying political dynamics, 
and that there was little appetite for or constituency that prioritizes such a 
cleanup. One stated: 
It’s not the end of the world [to have a convoluted Code]. It’s 
inefficient and so on and so forth. But it doesn’t really rise to a level 
that you’re going to go fight a war about. And it takes enormous 
amount of work to get that done . . . . But anyway, nobody cared. 
Nobody pushed it because Members don’t care because the affected 
tax writers don’t care. Go out and find some taxpayer who actually 
cares about . . . rules and how they should be drafted.114   
In this way, many interviewees suggested the original drafting decisions 
could prove to be sticky. If a broad but poorly tailored general rule had 
previously been written, for instance, that rule might have staying power due 
to stickiness, even if numerous exceptions had to be added later. The process 
that yields this layer-cake statutory structure can be described as statutory 
inertia, whereby not only the content of the law,115 but also its formulation, is 
difficult to change. As one interviewee explained, “[t]here’s a lot of inertia 
. . . in the tax world and . . . in Congress in general. . . . [I]t takes a lot to 
overcome that. And it usually ends up not happening.”116 
ii. Low Likelihood of Technical Corrections 
In response to our questions about the possibility of cleaning up the 
Code, several interviewees alluded to technical corrections legislation.117 
Several interviewees pointed to the difficulty in getting even technical 
corrections legislation (which fixes drafting errors) passed, let alone changes 
merely geared towards readability and clarity. A concern repeated by several 
interviewees was that Members would hijack a technical corrections bill to do 
much more than make technical corrections. One interviewee noted: 
If you introduce a technical corrections bill in the Senate what you 
have done is you have given every member of the Senate an 
opportunity to put on his favorite piece of crap. And so it never 
happens. Technical corrections bills generally ride on the heels of 
some other piece of tax legislation because nobody – in the House 
 
 114. See, e.g., id. Interviewee 14. 
 115. It is well understood that the legislative process is designed to make change difficult. 
See, e.g., Maxwell L. Stearns, The Misguided Renaissance of Social Choice, 103 YALE L.J. 1219, 1272 
(1994) (explaining that “numerous negative legislative checkpoints render passage of proposed 
legislation difficult by design” (footnote omitted)). However, to our knowledge, no one has yet 
observed or examined how inertial tendencies apply to the formulation, as opposed to the 
substance, of the law.  
 116. Anonymous Interview Collection, supra note 104, Interviewee 25.  
 117. For more information on technical corrections, see generally Marc J. Gerson, Technically 
Speaking: The Art of Tax Technical Corrections, 2007 TAX NOTES 927 (explaining what tax technical 
corrections are and the process for getting them enacted).  
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you can control the process, but you can’t control the process in the 
Senate.118 
Some interviewees noted that certain Members would have a very hard time 
being convinced that only technical corrections were being made and might 
block legislation for that reason. Interviewees noted that Members might even 
oppose corrective follow-up legislation that is clearly only technical in nature 
if they did not like the original legislation. Leaving flawed legislation as is, it 
was suggested, might make future reform more likely.  
One interviewee did suggest that it is possible to get technical corrections 
done for legislation that the same Congress had just passed because the 
Members might want to avoid looking bad for what they, themselves, had 
passed. But, overall, interviewees agreed that it is very difficult to use technical 
corrections to clean up the law that a different Congress passed.119   
iii. Limited Time and Resources 
Another feature of the legislative drafting process that several 
interviewees mentioned was time pressure and limited resources. These were 
cited as a reason why tax legislation may have been drafted in a less than 
comprehensible fashion in the first instance. Some interviewees suggested 
that ideally drafters would identify how a particular provision would affect and 
interface with other Code provisions. However, interviewees pointed out that 
drafters were often operating under immense time pressure. As a result, 
drafters may not do as good of a job thinking about the interrelationships 
between provisions as might otherwise be desirable.   
Time pressure was also cited as a reason why there is little appetite for 
revising the Code to make it more readable. As one interviewee put it:  
[W]e’ve got really scarce time and would you rather make it readable 
where the only person who would be reading . . . is us. Everybody 
else is going to like look it up and read it online. Would you rather 
get us to substantively improve the law some way? I think what’s hard 
to comprehend is how much time it would take to get past the 
technical correction that literally just re-wrote the section to have the 
absolute identical meaning but be more readable. I would not be 
surprised if that took hundreds of hours to get that passed.120 
In short, scarce time meant that cleaning up the Code takes a back seat to 
substantive policy activities and considerations. 
 
 118. Anonymous Interview Collection, supra note 104, Interviewee 8. 
 119. See, e.g., id. Interviewee 9 (“[T]here may be an exception to this, but I think very, very 
rarely, maybe I could say almost never, would that be a cleanup of a provision that was not the 
subject of recent legislation.”). 
 120. Id. Interviewee 10. 
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3. Who Controls Drafting 
i. Legislative Counsel Control over Language  
All interviewees indicated that the staff at the House and Senate Offices 
of Legislative Counsel (“Legislative Counsel”) was primarily responsible for 
making drafting choices.121 This was not surprising given what is previously 
known in the academic literature about legislative drafting.122 As discussed 
below, however, a couple of interviewees suggested that drafting became less 
disciplined and more collaborative when dealing with major legislation, and 
we also detected a shift towards more amorphous control over drafting and 
language over time.123 
The two Legislative Counsel offices hold primary drafting responsibility 
for the tax law, as they do with other areas of the law. The stated roles of House 
and Senate Legislative Counsel, respectively, are “to work with committees 
and Members to understand their policy preferences in order to implement 
those preferences through clear, concise, and legally effective legislative 
language”124 and “turn . . . request[s] into clear, concise, and legally effective 
legislative language.”125  
Consistent with these stated roles, our interviewees routinely reported 
that staff of the Legislative Counsel offices took the policies that Congress 
wished to enact and turned them into legislative language. This involved 
choices as to how to articulate particular rules (whether as a general rule 
followed by exceptions, or as a more narrowly defined rule, or whether to use 
a cross-referenced definition or a definition within a section, or some other 
option). Our interviewees also described how Legislative Counsel more 
generally had jurisdiction to consider—and did consider—the interaction 
between a particular, proposed change to the tax law and existing portions of 
the tax law, and how, if at all, the interface between the various provisions 
should be formulated in the Code.    
In making these choices, several interviewees noted that Legislative 
Counsel consults formal guides to drafting that exist for both House and 
Senate Legislative Counsel. These guides are the product of Legislative 
Counsel efforts over time. For example, the 1995 Edition of the House 
Legislative Counsel’s Manual on Drafting Style was originally prepared by 
 
 121. There is both an Office of Legislative Counsel of the U.S. House of Representatives and 
an Office of Legislative Counsel of the United States Senate. See supra note 10. 
 122. See generally Gluck & Bressman II, supra note 8 (describing the results of a survey of 
legislation drafters). 
 123. See infra Section III.B.3.iii. 
 124. Office of the Legislative Counsel: U.S. House of Representatives, supra note 10. 
 125. Office of the Legislative Counsel: United States Senate, supra note 10.  
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Ward Hussey in 1989.126 Other interviewees suggested (without referring to 
formal style guides) that there is just a certain style common to the tax law, 
which has perpetuated over time, and that part of what Legislative Counsel 
did was conform new tax law to this style. When pressed, some interviewees 
appeared to have a hard time articulating the components of that drafting 
style. But a few interviewees indicated that that style includes, generally, a 
general rule, followed by exceptions, with defined terms later in the statutory 
provision, and effective dates at the end. Finally, several interviewees 
suggested that certain choices by Legislative Counsel merely reflected the style 
of particular drafters, and that styles differ between different individuals at 
different times. 
ii. Deference to Legislative Counsel on Drafting Matters 
In light of Legislative Counsel’s clear, official role as the drafting arm of 
Congress, it was not surprising that we received the resounding response that 
Legislative Counsel makes drafting decisions. What was surprising was the 
Legislative Counsel’s extent of control over drafting decisions, and conversely 
the general lack of participation of other counsels and participants in making, 
questioning, or revising drafting and language choices made in this process. 
The participation of each of these other participants is described below. 
Members  
Beginning first with Members, our interviewees repeatedly reported that 
Congress Members themselves did not generally look at or consider statutory 
language.127 Rather, Members generally only dealt with the substantive ideas 
underlying the legislation, leaving it to Legislative Counsel and other 
professional tax staff (discussed more below) to turn those ideas into 
language. They would only pay attention to specific language if some 
constituency or interested party complained about it. This was the case even 
after the shift in the House Ways and Means Committee to markup of actual 
statutory language, described below.128 As one interviewee put it:  
A Member would never read the legislative language. They would 
probably never read the conceptual mark. They’d read the reading 
and they’d be briefed on it. I guess it really depends on the Member 
. . . but yeah it was the responsibility of staff to make sure that it 
 
 126. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL: U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HOUSE 
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL’S MANUAL ON DRAFTING STYLE (1995 ed.), https://legcounsel.house.gov/ 
HOLC/Drafting_Legislation/draftstyle.pdf. 
 127. Cf. Gluck & Bressman I, supra note 8, at 940 (finding that Members interact with abstract 
legislative policy rather than the granular text); Nourse & Schacter, supra note 8, at 585–86 
(finding that legislative text is mostly drafted by staff); see also Livingston, supra note 9, at 836 
(asserting that “[t]he fact is that members of Congress do not write tax statutes or committee 
reports, except in a very general sense”).  
 128. See infra Section III.B.3.iv. 
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reflected what the Member wanted and not for the Member to make 
sure that it reflected what the Member wanted.129 
Thus, Members would generally rely on their own professional staffs to 
ensure that what the Members believed was going to be enacted into law was 
enacted into law. The general consensus was that, as long as there was no 
question that the Members’ substantive intent was enacted into law, the 
Members would not quarrel regarding the particular way a tax statute was 
drafted. One interviewee noted that even the most intellectually inclined 
Member was very unlikely to focus on legislative language. Others suggested 
that it would be a waste of Members’ time to focus on legislative language, or 
even that they lacked the ability to do so in a meaningful way.   
In addition, one interviewee alluded to the fact that staff will sometimes 
deliberately keep the language from the Members by design. This is done to 
prevent Members from leaking bill text to lobbyists and outside interests, 
which would likely doom proposed legislation. This description paints a 
picture of a Congress not only not involved in the creation of the actual 
statutory text, but a Congress that is intentionally left out of the loop in order 
to improve the likelihood of success.  
Other interviewees affirmed this dynamic between Members and outside 
interests and the benefits of keeping language from Members. One noted:  
A Member of Congress doesn’t really pay much attention to the 
statutory language. But what they do is they receive feedback on the 
statutory language from the people who are pressing them. And so 
if there’s a draft out that the, you know, the people who are pushing 
the idea don’t like, they say you know what, if you conclude this, this 
really kills the whole idea of what we want to do. Then the Member 
of Congress who’s going to get into the act and say you know, let’s 
get rid of this thing, right? And that person typically will go to his or 
her top staffer and then which may be a committee staffer, personnel 
staffer. And then they will eventually try to translate and get the-get 
the revised draft out of that.130 
This description suggests that feedback from outside interests may actually 
prompt reconsideration or removal of proposed language, and it gives 
credence to the idea that keeping language from the Members may reduce 
the likelihood of roadblocks other Members and outside interests may erect. 
Along similar lines, another interviewee suggested that the drafting process 
might be improved if Members and their staff were kept out of the process, 
because their presence and their focus on discrete provisions detracted from 
getting things right.131 That interviewee also suggested, however, that keeping 
 
 129. Anonymous Interview Collection, supra note 104, Interviewee 10. 
 130. Id. Interviewee 2. 
 131. Id. Interviewee 26. 
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Members and staff out of the process would likely be politically 
unacceptable.132 
Other Government Counsels  
Beyond Members of Congress, interviewees suggested that there was also 
usually a clear demarcation of control between Legislative Counsel and other 
tax professionals and counsels involved in the drafting process. These other 
tax counsels involved in the drafting process include staff of the Joint 
Committee on Taxation, the staff members that serve on the congressional 
committees (for instance, majority and minority counsel for House Ways and 
Means or Senate Finance and their respective staffs), certain executive 
officials (such as staffers and counsels from the Treasury Department’s Office 
of Tax Policy), and others. These other tax professionals, in particular the JCT 
staff, would heavily participate in discussions of how to turn the Members’ 
agreements into law. However, their input tended to focus on broader policy, 
design, and implementation decisions, rather than statutory language itself.133  
JCT staff, for instance, would help think through what potential 
loopholes a new statutory provision might create and how best to address the 
loopholes. Or they would be responsible for thinking through how to take an 
idea the Members agreed to and make it work in a particular industry (all 
under the watch of the Members’ and committees’ own staff, to ensure the 
decisions accorded with the broad-based agreements Members reached). But, 
as to how to actually craft these decisions into statutory language, JCT staff, 
Treasury staff, and others in the room generally took a back seat. These 
formulation decisions (for instance, whether to use a new defined term or not 
or to what extent a new rule should be integrated into an old rule) were 
typically left to Legislative Counsel. When asked whether JCT or the other 
professionals in the room, outside of Legislative Counsel, could weigh in on 
these decisions, many interviewees suggested that any attempt to provide 
input into this formulation process would be viewed as nitpicking and a waste 
of time and resources. The other professional staff left these decisions to 
Legislative Counsel.  
Drafting Major Legislation 
Some interviewees suggested that this delineation of responsibility broke 
down somewhat when drafting and passing major legislation. Due to the 
technical difficulty, time pressure constraints, and complexity of major 
legislation, drafting major legislation was described as more “collaborative,” 
 
 132. Id. 
 133. Cf. Gluck & Bressman II, supra note 8, at 740 (describing Legislative Counsel as main 
drafters of text and other staffers, including those on committees, as policy drafters).  
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with Legislative Counsel drafters and JCT lawyers working together on major 
drafting projects.134 One interviewee noted:  
[W]hen you were dealing, at the end of a [legislative] session, with a 
gigantic piece of legislation, [the usual] process basically fell apart. 
And what happened would be that several people from each of the 
representatives’ staffs would be assigned to draft, and they would 
draft and the Leg. Counsel [i.e., Legislative Counsel] would sort of 
give it a cursory look, and it would go on this pile of crap that was on 
the Senate floor or the House Floor, and that’s what got passed.135 
This account indicates Legislative Counsel ceded some control over drafting 
in cases of passing major legislation under time constraints.  
In a similar vein, another interviewee described how drafting occurred 
during the lengthy 1986 legislation markup process.136 Because it was not 
feasible to have drafting take place only after the markup, drafting occurred 
during the markup process, often in the middle of the night due to time 
pressures. Once the day’s markup was over, the person responsible would go 
and draft. If policy issues or roadblocks came up during drafting, the staff 
would come back to the Ways and Means Committee, JCT, and Treasury and 
raise questions and obtain guidance. In this way, drafting during the 1986 
legislation markup was characterized as “a dynamic process where 
[participants] recognized that neither the markup process or the actual 
drafting process necessarily would reflect the final decisions.”137 
Thus, despite the repeated story of Legislative Counsel control over 
drafting, some interviewee accounts provided a flavor of how the drafting 
process might differ in cases of time crunched, major legislation. 
Ward Hussey  
While almost all interviewees emphasized Legislative Counsel control 
over drafting and language, interviewees who served during the 1980s 
emphasized the role of one Legislative Counsel in particular: Ward Hussey. 
Hussey began serving as House Legislative Counsel in 1946 and served for 43 
years, retiring in 1989.138 He rose to be head of House Legislative Counsel 
 
 134. See, e.g., Anonymous Interview Collection, supra note 104, Interviewee 2. 
 135. Id. Interviewee 8. 
 136. The House Ways and Means Committee markup of the 1986 legislation took 26 days 
and occurred between September 1985 and December 3, 1985. See KPMG, UNDERSTANDING THE 
TAX REFORM PROCESS: FAQS (UPDATED FOR WHAT’S HAPPENED LATELY) 6 (2017), https://home. 
kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/us/pdf/2017/06/tnf-new-faq-jun22-2017.pdf.  
 137. Anonymous Interview Collection, supra note 104, Interviewee 9. 
 138. Jasper L. Cummings, Jr. & Alan J.J. Swirski, Interview, Ward M. Hussey, ABA SEC. TAX’N 
NEWSQUARTERLY 4 (2013), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/aba_ 
tax_times/13spr/13spr-interview.authcheckdam.pdf.  
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and served as Legislative Counsel for all tax legislation, with the assistance of 
his deputy, John Buckley.139 
Interviewees who worked during Hussey’s tenure described him as an 
experienced and brilliant figure. We were told that Hussey was rumored at 
one point to have drafted 90 percent of the Code.140 When asked “What made 
Hussey so good?”, interviewees told us that he was a master of how the Code 
was written and understanding the interrelationships between different parts 
of the Code. Interviewees described both his deeply ingrained understanding 
of the Code’s patterns and how such patterns interrelated. He could tell how 
a change made in one part of the Code would reverberate in other parts of 
the Code. In the view of almost all of the interviewees who worked during his 
tenure, this made Hussey a real giant of tax law drafting.   
Interviewees who participated in the tax legislative drafting process 
during Hussey’s tenure also described how he exerted extensive control over 
the process. After a conceptual markup of tax legislation by Congress, the tax 
professional staff would assemble in a drafting room.141 The room contained 
a large drafting table (and, according to the recollection of some, no 
windows). Hussey would conduct a Socratic method questioning of the 
professional staff, asking them questions about how they thought Congress’s 
intent should be implemented in the form of law. In this process, the 
nonpartisan JCT staff was relied upon as the principal source of information 
for Hussey’s examination of the issues. He would push JCT experts on why 
they thought certain decisions should be made (for example, why a certain 
rule should be used to implement a particular policy decision by Congress, 
what the ramifications and problems would be, etc.).   
After the questioning and discussion was done, Hussey and Buckley 
would take principal control over turning the substance into legislative 
language. The other professional staff could raise problems with the proposed 
language, but any suggestions regarding formulation decisions (for example, 
decisions about whether to use a broad general rule plus exceptions or a 
narrower general rule with defined terms) were generally deemed to be the 
purview of Legislative Counsel. Likewise, several interviewees who worked 
with Hussey explained that no one would bring alternative legislative 
 
 139. John Buckley served in the House Office of Legislative Counsel from 1973–1993, in the 
House Ways and Means Committee as Minority Chief Tax Counsel from 1995–2006, as Majority 
Chief Tax Counsel from 2007–2010, and as Chief of Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation 
from 1993–1994. See John Buckley, JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAX’N, https://www.jct.gov/about-
us/history/former-chiefs-of-staff/33-john-buckley.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2018). Interviewees 
active in the 1980s also repeatedly mentioned Buckley’s role in drafting tax legislation. 
 140. It should be noted that this account is potentially at odds with the suggestion of some 
interviewees that drafting was more collaborative and less tightly controlled when passing major 
legislation. For discussion, see supra notes 134–37 and accompanying text. 
 141. The shift to markup of actual legislative language did not occur until later. For 
discussion, see infra Section III.B.3.v. 
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language to Hussey.142 Some interviewees referred to the possibility that 
Hussey might throw a drafting participant out of the room if he thought a 
participant had overstepped his or her bounds. One interviewee explained, 
“Basically what would happen is Ward would throw the person out of the 
room. Literally. Literally. Ward said, get out of here. We’re going to do it my 
way.”143  
Several interviewees suggested that the idea that Hussey would accept 
proposed language from a lobbyist or even from a Member’s office, even as a 
first draft, was unimaginable. Interviewees speculated that Hussey would have 
just ripped such language up.144 Hussey was clearly the tax drafting expert and 
the person responsible for formulating the legislative language and thinking 
about to what extent such legislative language should interact with, or change, 
other aspects of the Code. 
iii. Shift to More Amorphous Control of Drafting 
The story told by more recent participants in the tax legislation drafting 
process reflected more amorphous control over legislative language than 
during the 1980s. As noted, counsels and staff who participated in the 
legislative drafting process during Ward Hussey’s tenure—and who in 
particular were involved in the drafting of the 1986 Code—repeatedly 
mentioned the prominent role Hussey and Buckley played in the drafting and 
creation of the 1986 Code. And, as noted, they indicated that there was 
widespread deference to Hussey and Buckley in matters of statutory drafting, 
even if other participants were involved in questions of substantive tax policy 
design. In contrast, interviewees who participated in the process in later years 
pointed less frequently to the role and influence of one or two particular 
individuals.145 
When speaking with more recent counsels, there was a sense that a 
greater number of individuals may have had a hand in the drafting of statutory 
language, even if Legislative Counsel still ultimately held the pen. 
Interviewees indicated that staffers in Members’ offices may work with 
Legislative Counsel earlier in the process to formulate draft statutory 
language, which might then be circulated either to other Members or 
 
 142. Again, it is unclear how this account intersects with the suggestion that more individuals 
participated in drafting of major legislation. For discussion, see supra notes 134–37 and 
accompanying text. 
 143. Anonymous Interview Collection, supra note 104, Interviewee 8.  
 144. In an interview he gave when he departed the Legislative Counsel’s office, Hussey stated 
that once he had gained some experience as Legislative Counsel, lobbyists knew better than to 
try to influence the drafting process. See Ellin Rosenthal, After 42 Years, Behind-the-Scene Taxwriter 
Departs, 43 TAX NOTES 249, 250 (1989).  
 145. While interviewees mentioned the expertise and importance of John Buckley and 
another drafter in the Senate, James Fransen, interviewees did not repeatedly refer to their 
control over the process in the same way they did with Hussey. For more background regarding 
James Fransen, see 160 CONG. REC. S6584 (daily ed. Dec. 11, 2014) (tribute to James Fransen).  
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through the Senate Finance Committee or House Ways and Means 
Committee. Interviewees who were recent legislative process participants also 
indicated that lobbyists sometimes also offer actual legislative language, which 
a particular Member may promote.146 Several interviewees gave the caveat that 
participants in the drafting process would not take too seriously any legislative 
language that lobbyists clearly offered. One interviewee did suggest that 
lobbyists might have expertise with particular industries that might be 
valuable to counsels in crafting legislative language and policy.147   
One interviewee suggested that, unlike in times past (and in contrast to 
Hussey’s tenure), the tax legislative process now lacks a clear locus of 
control.148 Various counsels and staff including, for instance, JCT staff, Senate 
Finance Committee counsel, and House Ways and Means counsel, jockey for 
control. Who has the most dominant personality in a given room at a given 
time plays an outsize role in how the legislation was drafted.  
Despite the stated involvement of a greater number of individuals in the 
tax legislation drafting process, and despite the change in the House markup 
process described below, even the more recently active counsels agreed that 
Members themselves would almost never focus on the actual legislative 
language and may even be intentionally left in the dark regarding the 
proposed legislation until the last minute, in order to prevent the Members’ 
ability to leak the legislation.    
iv. Recycling of Legislative Language 
Importantly, several interviewees also indicated that drafters might reuse 
old proposed legislation that had previously been drafted when ideas and 
policy reforms that were formerly proposed became re-proposed in later 
years. Thus, drafters often do not start from scratch when drafting legislation, 
but rather draw on language that had previously been drafted. 
v. Shift in House Ways and Means Committee Markup Process 
One notable shift that more recent participants in the legislative drafting 
process described was the change in the markup process of the House Ways 
and Means Committee over time. This shift may relate to the turn to more 
amorphous control over legislative language discussed above.   
 
 146. See Shobe, supra note 8, at 847–49 (describing anecdotal evidence of the increased 
involvement of lobbyists in the drafting process, including offering draft bills); cf. Gluck & 
Bressman II, supra note 8, at 747 (mentioning Legislative Counsel being presented with text 
drafted by lobbyists, which Legislative Counsel may have limited leeway to change).  
 147. Cf. Nourse & Schacter, supra note 8, at 611–12 (describing view among congressional 
staffers that lobbyists’ input adds value to the legislative process, including, for instance, lobbyists 
providing initial drafts of legislation); Shobe, supra note 8, at 847–48 (describing “qualified 
praise” some staffers had for lobbyists’ involvement in the drafting process).  
 148. Anonymous Interview Collection, supra note 104, Interviewee 26. 
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Historically, and certainly in the time of Ward Hussey, Member markup 
of tax legislation in both the Ways and Means and the Senate Finance 
committees was purely conceptual, meaning that Members only fleshed out, 
and agreed upon, the substantive and policy aspects of tax legislation in 
markup sessions, rather than actual legislative language. In the mid-1990s, 
under the chairmanship of Bill Archer, the House Ways and Means 
Committee started requiring actual legislative language for markup sessions.  
As a result of this change, Legislative Counsel had to draft language prior 
to the markup session, with the idea that the Ways and Means Committee 
markup sessions would work off and be informed by the proposed legislative 
language. Interviewees mentioned that, even in the Senate, in which the 
markup session still remains—in theory—conceptual, Legislative Counsel 
formulates actual statutory language and the language exists prior to the 
markup session.149  
The upshot of this shift is that the Ways and Means Committee now has 
legislative language in front of it during markup. According to some 
interviewees, the shift has made the process more tedious and longer, has 
resulted in staff making more legislative language decisions in advance of 
guidance from Members, and has created more work for staff, with the result 
that more drafting help is sought from and outsourced to lobbyists. 
Interviewees indicated that despite the shift in markup practices, Members 
themselves still do not focus on actual statutory language, relying instead on 
the staff. Some interviewees explained that it was unrealistic to expect 
Members themselves to understand or engage with language.  
One interviewee suggested that the Members’ offices (though, again, 
almost never the Members themselves) have become engaged in fiddling with 
legislative language for a variety of purposes. For instance, a Member’s office 
may add certain language to proposed legislative language in the form of a 
heading, so as to emphasize how the legislation would help a certain 
constituency. The language would not necessarily have substantive effect, but 
could be used to make a messaging point. This might be the case, for example, 
with vanity bills drafted to make a point or suggest support for a certain 
platform, even if that bill has no chance of passage. Likewise, a Member’s 
office may repeat something that is already stated by cross-reference in a 
statutory provision to gain messaging benefits, even though the repetition 
(perhaps with slight alteration in specific words) may ultimately create 
confusion when courts have to interpret the provision.150   
 
 149. This shift in the Senate makes a certain amount of sense, given that Senate consideration 
follows after the legislation is passed by the House. For discussion, see supra Section II.A. 
 150. Cf. Gluck & Bressman I, supra note 8, at 954 (referencing drafters’ description that they 
may use redundant language to please stakeholders). For discussion, see infra Section IV.A.  
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vi. Move Away from Executive Branch Input 
Despite indications that more actors are now involved in the crafting of 
legislative language relative to the past, interviewees also suggested that there 
may be less executive branch input than previously. Interviewees observed 
that the Treasury Department and, in particular, the IRS used to have a more 
prominent seat at the drafting table. Some interviewees did note that 
Treasury’s involvement at a given time would depend on whether the same 
political party controlled Congress and the White House (thus leading to the 
possibility of more Treasury involvement when the parties were aligned). 
There was, nevertheless, a sense that, over time and all other things being 
equal, the Treasury and the IRS were less engaged in legislating.151 
Representatives from the IRS Legislation and Regulations Division of the 
office of Chief Counsel used to routinely offer comments on draft language.152 
This division no longer exists.153 Interviewees indicated that IRS participation 
in the process is more muted now. The IRS may participate in decisions that 
implicate tax administration directly, but the IRS does not necessarily have a 
seat at the drafting table, and is not necessarily routinely consulted about how 
a new provision will be administered, or how particular drafting decisions 
might affect tax administration.  
Interviewees offered various theories for why this shift has occurred. One 
interviewee suggested that particular Treasury or IRS officials overstepping 
their bounds and weighing in on policy decisions might explain not including 
them. Others suggested that by nature the Treasury Department is going to 
have less influence in the statutory than the regulatory process, and that thus 
their time is best spent elsewhere. Another interviewee suggested that the 
advent of email consultation meant there was less need for the IRS to be 
physically in the room. 
vii. Drafting Choices Intertwined with Policy Decisions 
Finally, it is important to emphasize that although the focus of our study 
was how drafting choices are made and the implications of such choices, some 
 
 151. A variety of anecdotal evidence suggests that this was certainly true of the 2017 tax 
reform. Despite the fact that both Congress and the White House were under Republican control, 
insiders reported that the Treasury was less engaged in the process than previously. See, e.g., 
Thomas D. Greenaway, Interview with Dana Trier, 37 ABA TAX TIMES, Spring 2018, at 6, 8 
(providing remarks of Dana Trier, who served as the Deputy Assistant Treasury for Tax Policy in 
the U.S. Treasury Department during the 2017 tax reform including, for instance, Trier’s 
observation that “[c]ompared to earlier periods, Treasury’s on-the-ground role in this tax 
legislation was circumscribed; it was not large”).  
 152. This squares with what we know about the subject from other sources. See I.R.S., 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE HIGHLIGHTS OF 1986, at 16 (1986). 
 153. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 106th CONG., STUDY OF PRESENT-LAW 
TAXPAYER CONFIDENTIALITY AND DISCLOSURE PROVISIONS AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 3802 OF THE 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE RESTRUCTURING AND REFORM ACT OF 1998, at 100 (Comm. Print 2000) 
(mentioning “[t]he former IRS Office of Chief Counsel’s Legislation and Regulations Division”).  
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interviewees were careful to note that drafting choices are often intertwined 
with policy decisions. Putting pen to paper to draft the law often raises 
implementation issues that cannot be foreseen when Members and their staffs 
agree to high-level policy. As a result, those who actually draft the law can 
make implementation decisions with significant substantive content.  
As just one anecdote of this, one interviewee described how Hussey (and 
his Legislative Counsel deputy, Buckley) came up with the content to carry 
out the rehabilitation tax credit. The interviewee described how, tasked with 
drafting the tax credit, the drafters had to figure out what rehabilitating a 
building actually meant. As the interviewee described, “They have this 
inherently murky concept. It’s their job to come up with something clear that 
you can actually apply. So bingo, [they came up with the rule that a 
rehabilitation means that you keep] three walls,” a solution that on one level 
seems arbitrary, but on another “was genius by Ward or John Buckley,” 
because it took the “inherently murky concept” of a rehabilitation and made 
it “enforceable.”154 As another interviewee remarked generally, “The 
technical issues are so enormous . . . so . . . a lot gets delegated to you, a lot of 
very, very significant stuff gets delegated to you.”155  
IV. INSIGHTS AND IMPLICATIONS 
Our interview findings have important implications. First, our study has 
implications for statutory interpretation in general. Second, it has 
implications for the tax system in particular. Third, it underscores several 
important questions about the legislative process.   
A. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
1. Affirmation of Prior Research 
Our study adds to and extends the growing legal literature regarding the 
implications of statutory drafting practices for statutory interpretation. While 
political scientists have long been attentive to some of the inner-workings of 
Congress,156 until recently legal scholars have paid surprisingly little attention 
to who does what in crafting legislation.157 Recently, a number of scholars 
have begun to rectify this deficit. Notable contributions include those by 
Professors Gluck and Bressman, Shobe, and Nourse and Schacter.158 While 
 
 154. Anonymous Interview Collection, supra note 104, Interviewee 3.  
 155. Id. Interviewee 14.  
 156. See generally, e.g., RICHARD F. FENNO, JR., CONGRESSMEN IN COMMITTEES (1973) (analyzing 
impact of congressional committees); KEITH KREHBIEL, INFORMATION AND LEGISLATIVE 
ORGANIZATION (1991) (setting forth an informational theory of how legislatures work); SINCLAIR, 
supra note 20 (examining a turn to unorthodox procedures in the legislative process).  
 157. See Gluck & Bressman I, supra note 8, at 911 (explaining that “[t]he foundational 
scholarship of federal legislation has, for the most part, been based on a generic and stylized 
account of statutory drafting”).  
 158. See supra note 8.   
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their extensive work has produced many findings, not all susceptible to 
distillation, some of their most important findings have included the 
following: Members of Congress themselves do not write the text of statutes, 
nor do they focus in particular on the text.159 Rather, Members of Congress 
focus on the concepts that will be translated into text.160 Professional drafters 
within Congress actually draft the statutory text.161 These drafters do not view 
themselves as having a principal relationship with courts. Rather, they 
principally view themselves in conversation with agencies that will implement 
the legislation.162 Partly as a result, the drafters pay varying level of attention 
to judicial canons of construction,163 although the greater professionalization 
of drafters over time may mean that current drafters pay more attention to 
judicial canons and legislative drafting issues than occurred in the past.164  
This new research has explored how drafting dynamics should impact 
judicial interpretation.165 For instance, in one article, Gluck and Bressman 
problematize common justifications for the use of judicial canons and explore 
what role canons can appropriately play in facilitating courts’ interpretive 
relationship with Congress.166 In another article, they explore how courts can 
root their interpretive theories more faithfully in the realities of the legislative 
process.167 Gluck and Bressman’s research builds on earlier work by Nourse 
and Schacter, who argued that their findings about the legislative process 
(which were similar to many by Gluck and Bressman) raise problems for 
existing judicial theories of interpretation and textualism in particular.168 
Shobe in part responds to Gluck and Bressman by arguing that the 
professionalization of legislative drafting over time suggests that certain 
approaches to judicial interpretation (in particular textualism) may be more 
appropriate as applied to newer statutes.169  
 
 159. See Nourse & Schacter, supra note 8, at 584–90. 
 160. See id.  
 161. See id. at 588–90. Interestingly, in their study of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Nourse 
and Schacter found that Legislative Counsel had a non-mandatory role in drafting. Id. at 588. In 
their work, Gluck and Bressman focused much more on the role of Legislative Counsel, who play 
a more significant role in most other areas of legislation. See Gluck & Bressman II, supra note 8, 
at 739 (explaining the difference).  
 162. Gluck & Bressman II, supra note 8, at 767.  
 163. See Gluck & Bressman I, supra note 8, at 924–64.  
 164. Shobe, supra note 8, at 854–60.  
 165. See, e.g., Gluck & Bressman I, supra note 8, at 908 (“[B]y way of making the stakes clear, 
the findings have potential relevance for virtually all of the major interpretive debates, both at 
the canon-specific level and also more broadly at the theoretical level.”).  
 166. See id. at 942–46.  
 167. See Gluck & Bressman II, supra note 8, at 779–91.  
 168. See Nourse & Schacter, supra note 8, at 616–21.  
 169. See Shobe, supra note 8, at 813–15. 
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Our study in some ways affirms the findings of these prior studies.170 In 
particular, we too found that Members only engage in drafting at a policy 
level, rather than engaging in the actual drafting of statutory text.171 Subject 
matter experts engage in the drafting and, when they do so, most are writing 
with other subject matter experts and intermediaries (including agency 
officials) in mind.172 They do not see themselves as being in a primary 
interpretive partnership with courts.173 In this way, our study bolsters some of 
the questions raised by the earlier work about whether existing theories of 
judicial interpretation enable courts to be faithful agents. For instance, like in 
the work of Gluck and Bressman, as well as Nourse and Schacter, our finding 
that Members are not closely engaged in the actual drafting of statutory text 
suggests some problems with judicial approaches that focus primarily or 
exclusively on the text of a statute as the best way to be faithful interpretive 
partners.174  
2. Deeper Challenges for Textualism 
But our study also pushes further than prior work. While the work of 
Gluck and Bressman and Nourse and Schacter suggests that attention to 
textual details may not be the best indicator of what Members meant to convey 
in the statute, their work left open the possibility that textual details may be 
the best indicator of the meaning that the actual drafters and professional 
staff meant to convey. Under some views, that may be enough to buoy a 
textualist approach as the best means of making meaning of statutes.175  
Our study challenges the notion that even the drafters and staff 
themselves necessarily mean to convey significant meaning through small 
textual details. For instance, interviewees told us that textual decisions can be 
largely “idiosyncratic,”176 reflecting, for instance, the specifics of how a 
particular piece of legislation has passed through the legislative process, what 
staffer has taken ownership of it, the particular personalities that dominated 
 
 170. See Burman et al., supra note 12, at 787–88 (underscoring the importance of 
confirmation studies).   
 171. See supra Section III.B.1.i.  
 172. See supra Section III.B.1, .3.  
 173. See supra Sections III.B.3.i.–.ii.  
 174. See, e.g., Abner S. Greene, The Missing Step of Textualism, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1913, 1916 
(2006) (describing textualism as a theory that attempts to promote faithful agency by 
“cordon[ing] off much material outside of statutory text”).  
 175. To some extent, Shobe takes this view when he points to the increasing 
professionalization of statutory drafting staffers as a justification for textualism. See Shobe, supra 
note 8, at 853. Note that there are other defenses of textualism that we do not address. For 
instance, as John Manning has explained, “[t]extualists often rely on the formal claim that 
bicameralism and presentment mandate textualism because the enacted text alone has survived 
the legislative process requirement of Article I, Section 7.” John F. Manning, Textualism and the 
Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 71 (2001).  
 176. Anonymous Interview Collection, supra note 104, Interviewee 4.  
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textual choices, attempts to follow old patterns simply for the sake of following 
patterns, and other path-dependent factors. Perhaps the most whimsical 
example of this is the fact that, as one interviewee pointed out, the Code 
contains the use of the word “thru” in numerous places, such as in the phrase 
“pass-thru,” even though the correct spelling should be “through,” as in “pass-
through.”177 As this interviewee explained, “thru” permeates the Code when 
it really should say “through” simply because Ward Hussey liked using “thru,” 
a usage that drafters then seemingly simply replicated even after Hussey was 
gone.178  
But staff indifference to particular textual choices extended beyond 
whimsical word choices, drafting idiosyncrasies, and inertial patterns. As Part 
III discussed, the government counsels we interviewed, many of whom were 
closely involved in the crafting and passage of tax legislation, generally did 
not think that particular textual choices mattered much, as long as the statute 
conveyed the agreed-upon substantive content. As one interviewee poignantly 
stated, “I don’t remember writing usually being the issue. That would often 
be like nitpicking and everyone being stressed out and being like; why are you 
nitpicking? No . . . real people are going to read the statue.”179 
As this statement indicates, at least in the tax arena, many government 
counsels closely involved in the creation of tax legislation view statutes as a set 
of instructions that will be mechanically transmitted to its subjects via I.R.S. 
publications, experts, and software providers, rather than a text that will be 
carefully parsed.180 These counsels generally do not contemplate that small 
textual choices in the statute will be ascribed meaning; they simply do not pay 
much attention to these choices, focusing on substantive policy instead. The 
counsels’ own perceptions of how meaning will be made of statutes thus 
sharply contrasts with the judicial practice of textualism. 
 
 177. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1(h)(10) (2012).  
 178. Anonymous Interview Collection, supra note 104, Interviewee 16. 
 179. Id. Interviewee 10. 
 180. To the extent that interviewees did consider how text would be parsed, they expressed 
the value they had placed on legislative history. See, e.g., id. Interviewee 3. For instance, in 
describing legislative history, as drafted by the JCT, one interviewee explained:  
[W]e always thought the legislative history was really solid because . . . you are 
textually explaining what you are trying to do. So we felt compared to the statute, 
this is a sort of an artificial, very formal artificial thing to try to address after language. 
It’s easier we thought to convey what is intended in legislative history.  
Id.  
However, conversations with interviewees tended not to focus much on legislative history or other 
interpretive aids courts might use. This was likely because, as mentioned in the text, interviewees 
typically envisioned transmission through experts and software providers rather than parsing by 
courts at all. In other words, interviewees did not appear to think about drafting choices as 
inextricably tied with questions of judicial interpretation, and did not emphasize judicial 
interpretations in their responses.  
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This incompatibility both deepens the general challenges to textualism 
mounted by recent literature181 and provides a counterweight against some 
arguments for textualism in the tax context.182 Aggressive tax planning, 
including tax shelters, often turns on claims that the Code should be applied 
in a literal way, with extensive attention being paid to small details that lead 
to unexpectedly taxpayer favorable results.183 Our study reveals that this type 
of aggressive tax planning, which relies on hyper-literal interpretations of the 
Code, is inconsistent with the mindset of Members as well as government 
counsels. Rather than focusing on small textual choices, Members pay little 
attention to the Code’s actual text. Moreover, while government counsels do 
focus on the text, they regard small textual choices as generally unimportant 
and certainly do not intend for these choices to be used in a way that subverts 
Congress’s policy.  
Thus, hyper-literal text-based analysis claiming that the text indicates 
Member and counsel intent misconstrues how textual decisions are often 
made in the actual process of legislating. Of course, there may be other 
arguments that support reliance on the literal text of the statute—for 
example, some might argue that the ability of the governed to rely on the 
legislated word is consistent with rule of law values. But our study does suggest 
that arguments for textualism that focus on text as a manifestation of Member 
and counsel intent are not generally reflective of how they actually approach 
statutory language choices.  
3. Beyond Prior Work: Canons of Construction  
Our study also supports and extends some of the findings of recent 
statutory drafting literature regarding canons of construction. In particular, 
Gluck and Bressman cast doubt on the underpinnings of many canons of 
construction, revealing that there is often a disconnect between judicial 
reliance on such canons and legislative drafting realities.184 Our study 
supports some of their findings.  
For instance, Gluck and Bressman find that none of the publicly stated 
justifications hold for the rule against superfluities, an interpretive canon that 
 
 181. Gluck & Bressman II, supra note 8, at 784–85; Nourse & Schacter, supra note 8, at 619–21.  
 182. See, e.g., N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N TAX SECTION, TAX REPORT NO. 797, REPORT ON THE 
PROPOSED PARTNERSHIP ANTI-ABUSE RULE 2 (1994) (making textualist case against partnership 
anti-abuse rule).  
 183. See, e.g., Joseph Bankman, Tax Enforcement: Tax Shelters, the Cash Economy, and Compliance 
Costs, 31 OHIO N. U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2005) (tying threat of tax shelters to literal interpretations of 
the Code); Noël B. Cunningham & James R. Repetti, Textualism and Tax Shelters, 24 VA. TAX REV. 1, 
3–4 (2004) (exploring how the rise of textualism facilitated the rise of tax shelters by legitimizing 
them); Tanina Rostain, Sheltering Lawyers: The Organized Tax Bar and the Tax Shelter Industry, 23 
YALE J. ON REG. 77, 94 (2006) (explaining that tax textualism “gain[ed] currency” alongside the 
rise of tax shelters).  
 184. Gluck & Bressman I, supra note 8, at 907.  
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attempts to avoid rendering parts of a statute redundant.185 Despite the fact 
that courts often rely on this canon, Gluck and Bressman found that drafters 
often actually intend to inject redundancy into the statute for a variety of 
reasons, such as to make sure they have captured all possibilities, or because 
they are using redundancy to satisfy particular stakeholders.186  
Our interviewees described similar dynamics, which support the critique 
of the rule against superfluities. For instance, we heard that staffers in a 
Member’s office may tinker with statutory language, including by adding 
unnecessary headings or language that is duplicative of a cross reference, in 
order to get messaging benefits or satisfy a particular constituency.187 Like in 
Gluck and Bressman’s study, this description undermines many of the 
underpinnings of a canon that tries to avoid finding redundant the very 
redundancies that drafters themselves admit to intentionally using.  
However, by examining the way that the tax law develops over time, 
rather than focusing on counsel perspectives in different areas at a particular 
point in time, our study also undermines even some of the canons for which 
Gluck and Bressman found substantial support. Take, as an example, the 
expressio unius canon, which suggests that the inclusion of specific items on 
a list suggests the intent to exclude others.188 Gluck and Bressman’s 
interviewees generally agreed that using a list signals the intent to exclude 
items not included on the list, thereby supporting the underpinnings of the 
canon.189  
Our study suggests that, even supposing that a list signals an intent to be 
exclusive at a given point in time, it may be unlikely to do so over time. In 
describing why they make particular drafting choices, our interviewees 
described how such choices are influenced by the law’s evolution. Taking a 
longitudinal view, the existence of a statutory list may not reflect an intent for 
a current statutory list to be exclusive. Rather, a list may better reflect the 
statute’s historical development and the difficulty in making changes over 
time.  
For example, the fact that the Code defines a capital asset through the 
broad, inclusive definition of “property held by the taxpayer,” followed by a 
list of specific items that are excluded from the definition of capital assets190 
does not necessarily mean that the list of exclusions is meant to be exclusive. 
 
 185. See id. at 930, 954.  
 186. Id. at 934.  
 187. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.  
 188. See, e.g., United States v. Oberle, 136 F.3d 1414, 1423–24 (10th Cir. 1998) (applying 
the expressio unius canon to conclude that the inclusion of only one section indicates Congress’s 
intent not to include others).  
 189. Gluck & Bressman I, supra note 8, at 933. Interestingly, their interviewees generally 
expressed that they reached this result based on “intuiti[on],” and thus did not need to formally 
employ a canon. Id.  
 190. I.R.C. § 1221 (2012).  
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In originally drafting the provision, the drafters were likely following the 
format that many interviewees described to us as the Code’s “style”—having a 
general rule followed by exceptions. Even if the section’s original drafters 
considered, at the time, all the potential exclusions they could think of, it is 
unlikely that the retention of this statutory format signals that the list of 
exclusions is meant to remain exclusive. Given the difficulty in changing 
statutory formulation,191 it is unlikely that modern drafters have updated the 
list to include every exclusion from the definition of capital assets that should 
exist, based on all of the potential classes of assets that exist today.192 Nor 
would maintaining the general rule plus exception format be likely to signal 
a considered desire for the list of exclusions to continue to be considered 
exclusive. Rather, keeping the old format of general rule followed by the 
exclusions is much more likely to have occurred simply because that is the way 
the section has always been written.193 Understanding the patterns and 
inertial tendencies that actually drive the drafting of tax legislation over time 
thus undermines a court’s ability to rely on the expressio unius canon to reach 
strong conclusions about the reach of a statute that evolved over time.  
The extent to which our study causes us to question the expressio unius 
canon is just one example of the insights that may be derived from a 
longitudinal examination of how drafters have actually made drafting 
decisions over time.194 By uncovering some of the factors that drive how 
statutory language accretes and evolves, our study takes an important step in 
that direction.  
B. IMPLICATIONS FOR OUR TAX SYSTEM 
Our study also has implications for the tax system outside of the courts. 
It illuminates the important distributional tradeoffs inherent in expert-
centered drafting, raises questions about how our tax system allocates 
responsibility for compliance, and suggests the need for strategies to more 
effectively help taxpayers comply with the law (including through use of 
technology and artificial intelligence).  
 
 191. See supra notes 115–16 and accompanying text.   
 192. See generally, e.g., Jay A. Soled, The Sale of Donors’ Eggs: A Case Study of Why Congress Must 
Modify the Capital Asset Definition, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 919 (1999) (using donated eggs as an 
example of how the default treatment as capital assets gets the wrong results for certain new 
classes of assets).  
 193. See supra Section III.B.2.i (discussing statutory inertia). 
 194. Gluck and Bressman acknowledge as much by emphasizing that their extensive study is 
merely an introduction into the importance of legislative practice for statutory interpretation. 
Gluck & Bressman II, supra note 8, at 800–01.  
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1. Expert-Centered Drafting and Legal Complexity:  
Distributional Tradeoffs 
 We set out to study why particular drafting choices are made, for 
example, why a drafter might use a general rule followed by exceptions, rather 
than a narrower general rule. However, despite our prodding, few 
interviewees were able to articulate, or were even particularly interested in 
articulating, the impact of particular drafting choices, viewing these questions 
as not very significant. This view derived in part from the belief that expert 
intermediaries, not ordinary taxpayers, were the audience for tax statutes, 
along with the unstated assumption that drafting choices by and large did not 
matter for such experts. Interviewees seemed to imagine a frictionless 
transmission of statutory content to tax experts of boundless capacity, who 
would in turn transmit such content to the law’s ultimate subjects. This led 
interviewees to view the benefits of cleaning up the Code’s formulation to be 
low. Meanwhile, they simultaneously perceived the costs of such cleanup to 
be high. Interviewees described how the process of enacting and absorbing 
new language was difficult and costly,195 politically risky,196 and could unsettle 
existing court interpretations and upend the expertise of experienced 
practitioners.197  
This expert-centric approach, and the other drafting dynamics that 
accompany it, leads tax law to have strong inertial tendencies, whereby 
existing formulations are likely to be preserved and whereby the law accrues 
in a layer-cake fashion over time and becomes ever more convoluted. These 
inertial tendencies are a significant but underappreciated contributor to legal 
complexity. Scholars from a variety of fields have observed and analyzed how 
the law seems to become increasingly lengthy and complex over time.198 Our 
study provides unique insights into the process by which drafting can lead to 
increasing statutory complexity.199 While focusing on substantive rather than 
 
 195. See supra Section III.B.2.iii. 
 196. See supra Section III.B.2.ii.  
 197. See supra Section III.B.2.i. It is worth noting that there may also be a more psychological, 
and less conscious explanation, for the phenomenon of statutory inertia: a status quo bias. As 
researchers have explored, individuals may exhibit the bias as a result of “convenience, habit or 
inertia.” William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J. RISK  
& UNCERTAINTY 7, 10 (1988). Our interviewees’ descriptions of how they make drafting decisions 
appeared consistent with status quo bias. Indeed, when asked why certain drafting choices were 
made, interviewees often suggested that drafting decisions were done to keep the existing style 
of the Code, or because new drafts would simply work off old models, even when those models 
were not a great fit for the problem at hand. See supra Section III.B.2.i. 
 198. See, e.g., Bayless Manning, Hyperlexis and the Law of Conservation of Ambiguity: Thoughts on 
Section 385, 36 TAX LAW. 9, 9–12 (1982); Mila Sohoni, The Idea of “Too Much Law,” 80 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 1585, 1601–22 (2012). Some have defended the ever-growing legal rules. Sohoni, supra, 
at 1622–31 (critically analyzing the claim that the proliferation of the law reflects democratic failure). 
 199. As noted above, complexity of the written statute is only one dimension of tax 
complexity. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
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formulation issues may be the least costly way of minimizing substantive 
mistakes, this approach also tends to lead drafters to tolerate increasingly 
convoluted formulations that accrete over time. 
The mortgage interest deduction, which underwent significant 
modification in the 2017 tax reform, is one example of this phenomenon.200 
The 2017 legislation significantly lowered the amount of debt the interest on 
which is eligible for the deduction.201 This, when paired with the increase in 
the standard deduction, has drastically reduced the extent to which taxpayers 
will use the mortgage interest deduction. And yet, in terms of formulation, 
the 2017 reform left in place the broad general rule stating that all interest is 
deductible, followed by the exception disallowing the deduction for personal 
interest, followed by the exception to that exception, which ultimately permits 
the mortgage interest deduction.202 The new limitation on deductibility was 
simply layered on top of this already very complex framework in the form of 
a new “special rule,” (I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(F)), which imposes the new dollar 
limitation and only applies from years 2018 through 2025.203 There was no 
accompanying reworking of the statute’s existing language or structure. The 
result, over time, is an enormously complex statute that newcomers will likely 
struggle to understand.204 
An increasingly convoluted Code has underappreciated distributional 
tradeoffs. Most strikingly, while our interviewees highlighted the benefits of 
law accruing in patchwork fashion, namely not upsetting interpretations of 
and reliance on current formulations,205 they did not seem to appreciate the 
costs of not reformulating to anywhere near the same extent. While making 
patchwork changes may benefit existing parties who have reliance interests 
on existing Code formulations, an increasingly convoluted and hard-to-read 
Code creates barriers-to-entry to outsiders, including new entrants to the tax 
profession and other professional advisors, which may thus yield higher fees 
for tax advice. A convoluted Code may also create interpretive problems for 
generalist courts. In addition, the increasing convolution of the Code has 
 
 200. I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(F) (2012); H.R. REP. NO. 115-466, § 11043, at 34–35 (2017). 
 201. Kathryn Vasel, Homeowners: Here’s What’s in the Tax Bill for You, CNN (Dec. 17, 2017, 
12:17 PM), https://money.cnn.com/2017/12/17/real_estate/tax-bill-mortgage-property-tax-
deductions/index.html.  
 202. I.R.C. § 163. 
 203. Id. § 163(h)(3)(F); H.R. REP. NO. 115-466, § 11043, at 34–35.   
 204. One interviewee who suggested that drafting choices do not matter because “[n]o real 
people are going to read the statute” also offered that teaching this same statute to tax students 
is laborious because of how difficult the statute is to read, precisely because of its drafting. 
Anonymous Interview Collection, supra note 104, Interviewee 10. Some interviewees thereby 
indirectly confirm that there are costs from certain drafting choices, even as they professed that 
such choices did not matter. Id. 
 205. See supra Section III.B.2.i. 
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often been used to advocate for tax simplification, which may well be a cover 
for tax deregulation.206 
In short, by focusing on the benefits of keeping formulation the same for 
existing users, drafters tolerate increasing statutory complexity and may be 
privileging entrenched interests relative to newcomers and laypersons, who 
may struggle with the impenetrable nature of the tax law. The distributional 
consequences of these choices—whether unintended or deliberate—may be 
profound. 
2. Allocating Responsibility in an Expert-Centric System 
The fact that the Code is complex and geared towards expert 
intermediaries raises questions about how our tax system assigns responsibility 
for tax compliance. Arguably, the way responsibility is currently allocated 
appears inconsistent with the drafters’ vision of how the law they draft will be 
used. Our tax system treats taxpayers themselves, rather than experts and 
software companies, as primarily responsible for accurately filling out 
returns.207 A taxpayer must sign her tax return attesting that, under penalties 
of perjury, she has examined her tax return, accompanying schedules and 
statements, and to the best of her knowledge and belief, they are true and 
correct.208 Various penalties apply to taxpayers for inaccurate returns.209 
There are defenses to penalties such as the “reasonable cause and good faith” 
exception.210 But there is uncertainty regarding the scope of these defenses, 
particularly for errors that may result in part from the actions of sophisticated 
intermediaries, such as tax return software companies,211 and for bad 
behaviors that may have been induced by experts’ advice.212 In short, there is 
 
 206. See, e.g., Emily Cauble, Superficial Proxies for Simplicity in Tax Law, 53 U. RICH. L. REV. 329,  
334–38 (2019) (discussing confusion between simplification efforts and deregulation); Steven 
A. Dean, Attractive Complexity: Tax Deregulation, the Check-the-Box Election, and the Future of Tax 
Simplification, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 405, 419–20 (2005) (citing calls for tax reform that rely on 
Code complexity); Steven A. Dean, Tax Deregulation, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 387, 410–13 (2011) 
(explaining the difference between tax simplification and tax deregulation). 
 207. Cf. Mark D. Janis & Timothy R. Holbrook, Patent Law’s Audience, 97 MINN. L. REV. 72, 
86–89 (2012) (examining problems with a complex patent law, which is incomprehensible to 
the general public, being directed toward the general public).   
 208. I.R.S., Form 1040 (2017), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1040.pdf.  
 209. I.R.C. § 6662 (2012). 
 210. Id. § 6664.  
 211. See, e.g., Rodney P. Mock & Nancy E. Shurtz, The TurboTax Defense, 15 FLA. TAX REV. 443, 
532 (2014) (“[T]he Tax Court has missed almost every opportunity to clarify and expand upon 
exactly when a TurboTax defense is justifiable.”). 
 212. See, e.g., Bedrosian v. United States, No. 15-5853, 2017 WL 1361535, at *2, *5 (E.D. Pa. 
Apr. 13, 2017) (appealing from government attempt to impose 50% willful penalty for failure to 
list bank account in FBAR; District held that government failed to prove that taxpayer’s action 
was willful). Taxpayers may not rely on IRS publications to assert the amount of tax owed, though 
such reliance might be considered in determining penalties. See Emily Cauble, Detrimental Reliance 
on IRS Guidance, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 421, 438.  
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a risk that our tax system assigns ordinary taxpayers disproportionate 
responsibility for complying with laws that most drafters do not expect them 
to understand and that they do not, in fact, understand. 
How significant is this risk? Certain factors, if present in our tax system, 
might reduce it. First, if IRS forms and instructions, tax prep software, and the 
advice of experts are accessible and comprehensive enough to educate 
taxpayers, then perhaps it is not so problematic that taxpayers aren’t meant 
to understand the statutes themselves. Second, if penalties for errors or 
certain failures to comply were shifted to experts where appropriate, this 
would arguably bring the allocation of filer responsibility in the tax system in 
line with drafters’ expectations.213 Finally, if the law was simple and intuitive 
or the behaviors that constitute wrongdoing were obvious, we might be more 
inclined to view ignorance of the law as no excuse.214 
The problem is that these offsetting factors, as they exist in our tax 
system, are likely insufficient to offset the risk of disproportionate allocations 
of responsibility to taxpayers. First of all, the Code is so complex that it is 
unrealistic to expect that tax forms and instructions can capture every single 
rule, exception, and nuance of the tax law.215 A taxpayer who just reads forms 
and instructions risks missing rules and exceptions that may apply. 
Furthermore, the mere process of communicating financial and other facts 
from a taxpayer who might not understand the law to an advisor or computer 
program can result in errors due to misunderstandings about which facts are 
legally relevant. To be sure, some taxpayers, such as W-2 wage earners, may 
find forms and instructions sufficient and compliance easy despite complex 
statutes. However, others (e.g., small business owners,216 taxpayers with cross-
border income,217 and taxpayers who are eligible for the Earned Income Tax 
 
 213. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6664(d)(4) (applying penalty to preparers for understatement due to 
unreasonable positions). 
 214. See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 197 F.3d 211, 218 (6th Cir. 1999) (“Even those not 
versed in the law recognize the centuries-old maxim that ‘ignorance of the law is no excuse.’”).  
 215. See Blank & Osofsky, supra note 89, at 204–34 (highlighting ways that IRS publications 
deviate from the underlying tax law); see also Cauble, supra note 212, at 438 (noting that taxpayers 
may not rely on I.R.S. publications to assert amount of tax owed).  
 216. Stacy Cowley, Why the I.R.S. Fails to Crack the Small-Business Tax Nut, N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/16/business/smallbusiness/why-the-irs-fails-to-crack-
the-small-business-tax-nut.html (noting that many small business owners do not fully understand 
the extent of their tax obligations, including, for instance, estimated reporting and the self-
employment tax, in part as a result of “impenetrable” tax laws).  
 217. See, e.g., Hearing on the Need for Comprehensive Tax Reform to Help American Companies 
Compete in the Global Market and Create Jobs for American Workers Before H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 
112th Cong. (2011) (statement of Dirk J.J. Suringa, Partner, Covington & Burling) (practitioner 
testimony before Congress on the exceedingly complex foreign tax credit rules); Letter from 
Troy K. Lewis, Chair, AICPA Tax Exec. Comm., to John A. Koskinen, Comm’r, I.R.S., William J. 
Wilkins, Chief Counsel, I.R.S., Robert Stack, Deputy Assistant Sec’y, Int’l Tax Affairs, Dep’t of the 
Treasury, Danielle Rolfes, Int’l Tax Counsel, Dep’t of the Treasury (Aug. 15, 2016) (recommending 
simplified tax compliance procedures for Americans living abroad on the grounds that “it is unfair 
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Credit,218 to name just a few categories) may face greater challenges in 
interfacing with IRS or expert guidance.  
Second, our tax system does not allocate liability to experts and 
sophisticated intermediaries to anywhere near the same degree as that placed 
on taxpayers. While preparers also must attest to the accuracy of a tax return 
they prepare (taking into account the information they actually knew)219 and 
are subject to certain penalties,220 there remains a significant gap between the 
responsibilities and penalties that apply to preparers, which are generally 
quite light,221 and those that apply to taxpayers.222 Some might argue that 
penalties are actually imposed on ordinary taxpayers so sparingly that the fact 
they are unlikely to understand the law is not worrisome. But this response is 
inadequate. A large swath of taxpayers finds the prospect of IRS audit and 
potential penalties frustrating and anxiety-provoking,223 a phenomenon that 
the government uses to support its compliance efforts.224 Taxpayers’ beliefs 
that they may be subject to negative consequences for inaccurate application 
of law they do not necessarily understand is thus relevant, even if the 
likelihood of penalty is low.  
Finally, our tax laws are complex and often unclear and non-intuitive. 
Furthermore, tax is an area in which the government places an affirmative 
 
to subject these taxpayers to a complicated, time-consuming, and potentially expensive reporting 
requirement for information available to the IRS from alternative sources”). 
 218. See, e.g., Leslie Book, The IRS’s EITC Compliance Regime: Taxpayers Caught in the Net,  
81 OR. L. REV. 351, 352 (2002) (“The EITC is excessively complicated in its application and can 
have significant and sometimes unforeseen consequences on the lives of those who are the 
provision’s beneficiaries, largely the working poor, of whom great numbers are racial minorities 
and women.”). 
 219. I.R.S., Form 1040, supra note 208. 
 220. I.R.C. § 6694(a) (2012) (applying penalty to preparers for understatement due to 
unreasonable positions).  
 221. See, e.g., id. § 6694(a)(1) (setting tax return preparer penalty equal to the greater of 
$1,000 or 50% of the income derived by the tax preparer from the return).  
 222. See, e.g., Haynes v. United States, No. EP-16-CV-112-KC, 2017 WL 2895438, at *5–6 
(W.D. Tex. June 15, 2017), on appeal, No. 17-50816 (5th Cir.) (holding that couple whose return 
was e-filed by their CPA did not have reasonable cause defense to late filing penalties for e-filing 
error due to software malfunction). For example, the preparer penalties for “understatements 
due to unreasonable positions” are limited only to the greater of $1,000 or the “income derived 
(or to be derived) by the tax return preparer,” and therefore may not adequately incentivize 
sophisticated intermediaries to protect against inadvertent errors they make in translating the tax 
law. I.R.C. § 6694(a). 
 223. See, e.g., Stacey Vanek Smith, Stanford Professor Loses Political Battle to Simplify Tax Filing 
Process, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Mar. 29, 2017, 4:41 PM), https://www.npr.org/2017/03/29/5219 
54033/stanford-professor-loses-political-battle-to-simplify-tax-filing-process (“Filing taxes each year, it’s 
one of the most important interactions you’ve got with your government. And how does it make 
you feel? It makes you pissed. You can’t understand it. You’re anxious. You’re worried about 
screwing up.” (quoting Joseph Bankman’s description of the tax filing process)). 
 224. See generally Joshua D. Blank & Daniel Z. Levin, When Is Tax Enforcement Publicized?,  
30 VA. TAX REV. 1 (2010) (using empirical evidence to surmise that the IRS deliberately uses tax 
enforcement publicity to influence taxpayers’ perceptions of enforcement).  
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obligation on the entire taxpaying population to engage in elaborate steps to 
comply with these detailed and often non-intuitive laws. Thus, the maxim that 
ignorance of the law is no excuse should arguably be more bounded in the 
case of tax statutes.225 Indeed, the greater concern with respect to tax statutes 
may be how to square difficult-to-decipher tax statutes, and taxpayers’ 
obligations to apply them, with the rule of law principle that the government 
must make the law accessible to the governed.226 Like the allegory of Emperor 
Nero placing the law high on tablets where it is difficult to read, which was a 
classic affront to the rule of law227 drafting tax statutes for experts while 
leaving compliance responsibility on taxpayers may threaten fundamental 
rule of law values.  
There are potential ways to reform the tax system’s allocation of 
responsibility to better align with the expert-driven system envisioned and 
implemented by drafters. However, the system’s very reliance on experts, in 
addition to other factors, makes these reforms difficult. For instance, one 
possibility is that rather than starting with a default in which taxpayers are 
primarily on the hook, perhaps penalties should instead be allocated based 
on whether the wrong facts or the wrong law were applied. If the wrong facts 
were applied, the penalty could presumptively be imposed on the taxpayer 
(who is typically in possession of the underlying facts, such as the amount of 
income earned in a given year). If, instead, the law is applied incorrectly to 
the facts, the penalty could presumptively be imposed on the preparer, in 
cases where a preparer (whether human or software) was responsible for the 
wrong law. Here, the revised penalty might be based on the amount of 
underpayment, rather than the current set amount. Such a system may better 
allocate responsibility to the correct parties and may incentivize preparers to 
ask taxpayers the right questions and give accurate advice, effectively enlisting 
preparers as enforcers of the tax law.228  
But there are difficulties with this approach. Some may worry that any 
weakening of penalties on taxpayers themselves may reduce sorely needed 
incentives for taxpayers to report honestly.229 And perhaps the new allocation 
of responsibilities would create gaps that could be exploited by taxpayers, 
preparers, or some combination thereof, thereby undermining deterrence.230 
 
 225. See generally Dan M. Kahan, Ignorance of Law Is an Excuse—But Only for the Virtuous,  
96 MICH. L. REV. 127 (1997) (examining how the maxim does or does not operate in certain 
contexts and focusing on tax as an area in which it does not operate, albeit in the criminal context).  
 226. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1179 (1989).  
 227. Id.  
 228. Cf. Rachelle Y. Holmes, The Tax Lawyer as Gatekeeper, 49 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 185, 190–201 
(2010) (examining potential role for tax advisor in gatekeeper capacity).  
 229. See IRS, Tax Gap: Tax Gap Estimates for Tax Years 2008–2010, https://www.irs.gov/ 
newsroom/the-tax-gap (last visited Nov. 14, 2018) (estimating that the average annual tax gap, 
the amount of taxes owed but not paid, for years 2008–2010 was $458 billion).  
 230. See Michael G. Allingham & Agnar Sandmo, Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis,  
1 J. PUB. ECON. 323, 332–37 (1972) (introducing classic deterrence model of tax compliance). 
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Relatedly, such an approach may present line-drawing issues as between 
mistakes of fact and law. In some cases, it is not obvious whether a fact is 
relevant if one does not know the law. Another problem is that if the risk 
imposed on preparers is too large compared to the economic upside of 
preparing the return, preparers may refuse to prepare certain returns (for 
example, tax returns presenting complicated or uncertain tax issues).  
More fundamentally, the very dependence of taxpayers on preparers may 
make it difficult to ensure that preparers actually bear the full burden of any 
penalties imposed on them. If new penalties are placed on preparers, they 
may charge high premiums to cover their risk, or they may create contracts 
that require taxpayers to indemnify the preparers. Preparer resistance to 
increased penalties, buoyed by a tradition of penalties being placed on 
taxpayers, would also likely be strong, potentially dooming a significant 
increase in responsibilities being shifted onto preparers. All of this suggests 
that any proposed penalty reform would need to be carefully tailored to 
achieve the desired outcome, and that any such reform might face significant 
objections from software companies and tax preparers.  
3. Implications for Technology in Tax Preparation 
Our study suggests the need for strategies to more effectively help 
taxpayers comply with law for which they are not the primary audience. Here, 
it may be useful to consider the interaction between the drafting practices we 
uncovered and the role of technology in tax preparation. For instance, if 
taxpayers are not the intended audience of the tax law, and if existing 
guidance is inadequate, this may suggest that the government should take a 
more active role filling out taxpayers’ returns for them (for example, by 
electronically pre-populating tax returns with taxpayer data).231 Along the 
same lines, perhaps in the future artificial intelligence could play a greater 
role in helping taxpayers comply with tax law.232 While the tax system already 
 
A vast literature has followed regarding tax penalties. See generally, e.g., Joshua D. Blank, Collateral 
Compliance, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 719 (2014) (examining ways non-tax consequences may bolster 
tax penalties); Mark P. Gergen, Uncertainty and Tax Enforcement: A Case for Moderate Fault-Based 
Penalties, 64 TAX L. REV. 453 (2011) (justifying fault-based penalties on deterrence grounds).  
 231. See, e.g., Letter Re: Support for the Tax Filing Simplification Act of 2016 (Apr. 18, 2016), 
https://www.warren.senate.gov/files/documents/Tax_Filing%20Expert_Letter_4-18-16.pdf 
(providing a letter of 54 tax professors supporting the Tax Filing Simplification Act, a bill that 
would among other things “allow[] taxpayers with simple returns to request a pro-forma return 
pre-populated with taxpayers’ data, completed tax calculations, and the amount of taxes or refund 
due”); Farhad Manjoo, Would You Let the I.R.S. Prepare Your Taxes?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/16/technology/personaltech/turbotax-or-irs-as-tax-preparer-
intuit-has-a-favorite.html (discussing potential for government creation of new tax preparation 
method to reduce costs of tax filing, which would include I.R.S. pre-calculating tax liability for 
many taxpayers). 
 232. Sarah B. Lawsky, A Logic for Statutes, 21 FLA. TAX REV. 60, 77–79 (2017) [hereinafter 
Lawsky, A Logic for Statutes] (arguing that default logic may be beneficial for artificial 
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contains some of these features to some degree, the fact that drafters are not 
writing the tax law intending it to be useable by ordinary taxpayers may 
suggest the need for a more complete paradigm shift. Such a shift would have 
the benefit of lessening the burden imposed on taxpayers to “get it right” 
themselves even if they do not understand the law.  
As was the case with penalties, however, there are challenges associated 
with these types of reforms. For instance, with respect to artificial intelligence, 
Sarah Lawsky has recently examined how the Code could be reformulated 
using logical reasoning to make it easier to program for AI.233 However, our 
findings suggest that drafters are not currently consciously optimizing tax law 
drafting for the purposes of computer programming. Even though some 
interviewees mentioned the importance of implementation by TurboTax, 
most understood the primary audiences for tax statutes to be humans 
(including IRS form and instruction writers and sophisticated tax advisors), 
not machines.234 Interviewees repeatedly referenced Code patterns that have 
existed since the 1950s and did not indicate that drafting practices are 
designed to optimize computer programming capacities in any way.235 
Moreover, as discussed previously, drafting practices tend to be sticky, with 
drafters continuing to use old models and existing patterns and practices. 
Existing drafting practices are based on approaches and styles created in 
drafting manuals that date back to 1989, which certainly were not created 
with optimal programming considerations in mind.236 All of this suggests that, 
should we decide that a more complete shift to use of artificial intelligence is 
warranted, that shift would likely require a more conscious reappraisal and 
reform of existing drafting practices.  
There are also other challenges associated with having the government 
fill out taxpayers’ returns for them or turning to AI to prepare tax returns. In 
addition to the privacy issues raised by a significantly greater turn to AI or 
computers,237 the very power of preparers in the existing system makes some 
of these reforms difficult. For instance, tax preparation companies on whom 
the current system relies have strongly lobbied against the government using 
information already in its possession to automate preparation of taxpayers’ 
 
intelligence); see also Sarah B. Lawsky, Formalizing the Code, 70 TAX L. REV. 377, 394–99 (2017) 
(examining how the Code could be reformulated using logical reasoning). 
 233. Lawsky, A Logic for Statutes, supra note 232, at 77–79. 
 234. For discussion, see supra Section III.B.1.i. 
 235. See supra text accompanying note 125. 
 236. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.  
 237. See, e.g., Ryan Calo, Artificial Intelligence Policy: A Primer and Roadmap, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 399, 420–25 (2017). 
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returns.238 These lobbying efforts have impeded more extensive government 
preparation of taxpayer returns.  
Fundamentally, we have a tax system that is geared towards experts and 
preparers but that still places principal responsibility on taxpayers themselves. 
There may be good reasons for such a system—for example, the existence of 
different types of taxpayers and aggressive tax planning behavior may demand 
complex laws, which then require experts to serve as interpreters and 
intermediaries.239 But this system also has real costs. It puts power in the hands 
of experts and intermediaries, potentially raising compliance costs for 
taxpayers, while simultaneously making it difficult to impose penalties on the 
experts themselves for mistakes. It also may lead at least some taxpayers to be 
filled with anxiety about signing tax returns (subject to penalties) that they do 
not understand.240 The fact that drafters generally know and intend that 
ordinary taxpayers will not understand the tax law calls for a more conscious 
reappraisal of these costs.  
C. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE TAX LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 
Our study also provides important insights about the process by which 
tax legislation is enacted. For instance, while our study did not specifically set 
out to study the 2017 reform, the data we gathered is useful in helping us 
contextualize and understand the criticisms of the tax reform process.241 This 
contextualized understanding calls for a deeper appraisal of the legitimacy of 
the legislative process. 
1. Member Engagement with Statutory Text: Myth vs. Reality 
A subset of criticisms of the recent 2017 tax reform—one of the most 
significant tax reforms in recent history242—centered on Democratic 
Members’ lack of opportunity to read the legislation.243 Critics charged that 
much of the process seemed to happen under cover of night, with little time 
for the Congress Members (Senators in particular) to read, much less digest, 
 
 238. See, e.g., Jay A. Soled & Kathleen DeLaney Thomas, Regulating Tax Return Preparation,  
58 B.C. L. REV. 152, 18283 (2017) (discussing strength of preparer lobby as employed against 
efforts to turn toward government preparation of tax returns).  
 239. See generally, e.g., Louis Kaplow, A Model of the Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules,  
11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 150 (1995) (exploring the tradeoff between complexity and accuracy 
whereby complexity helps more accurately meet certain goals, including redistribution).  
 240. See supra note 226 and accompanying text (giving a description of how the complex 
statutes can cause this type of stress). As just an anecdote, WebMD even has a webpage dedicated 
to how to cope with Tax Filing Season Stress. How to Cope With Tax-Time Stress, WEBMD, 
https://www.webmd.com/balance/stress-management/features/cope-tax-time-stress (last visited 
Nov. 16, 2018).  
 241. See, e.g., supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 242. See, e.g., supra notes 1–7 (characterizing legislation as sweeping and/or problematic).  
 243. See, e.g., supra note 6 and accompanying text.  
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the bill.244 Howls of protest were heard on the Internet, Twitter, and major 
news sources.245 Democrats in Congress, academics, and ordinary citizens 
alleged that the fact that Senators did not have time to read the actual text of 
the bill prior to voting on it (as epitomized by the handwritten scrawls that 
remained on the final copy) represented a significant breakdown in the 
legislative process and called into question the bill’s legitimacy.246  
It is possible that these protests were meant to communicate something 
more subtle. For instance, perhaps Democratic Members’ protests about lack 
of time to read the bill really meant to communicate the lack of time for their 
staffers to write briefs of the bill for them, or for Members to read their 
staffers’ briefings. In other words, perhaps Democratic complaints meant to 
communicate anger at the lack of opportunity to read legislation prior to voting 
and the lack of opportunity to engage staffers in the process of evaluating it. 
But Democratic Members did not actually make these more nuanced 
arguments. Rather, they focused on their own inability to read the bill. For 
instance, Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer protested, “Not a single 
member of this chamber has read the bill. . . . It would be impossible.”247 
These complaints, which focus specifically on Members themselves 
reading the bill, are simply out of step with the realities of legislating. Our 
research, as well as other recent research,248 suggests that Congress Members 
not actually reading the 2017 tax legislation prior to voting was nothing new. 
Not only did the counsels we interviewed overwhelmingly agree that Members 
 
 244. See, e.g., supra note 6 and accompanying text; see also Stephen E. Shay, Tax Reform 
—Process Failures, Loopholes and Wealth Windfalls 1–2 (Nov. 21, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3076151 (noting process failures in the 
enactment of the 2017 tax reform). 
 245. See, e.g., supra notes 44–47 (critiquing the passage of the tax reform on both various 
process and substantive grounds).  
 246. See, e.g., Senator Jon Tester (@SenatorTester), TWITTER (Dec. 1, 2017, 6:06 PM), 
https://twitter.com/SenatorTester/status/936748480000921600 (“I was just handed a 479-
page tax bill a few hours before the vote. One page literally has hand scribbled policy changes on 
it that can’t be read. This is Washington, D.C. at its worst. Montanans deserve so much better.”); 
Senator Bob Menendez (@SenatorMenendez), TWITTER (Dec. 1, 2017, 5:30 PM), https:// 
twitter.com/SenatorMenendez/status/936739294026387462 (“So much for regular order! Oh 
yeah sure, we’ll have plenty of time to read the final GOP tax bill—if you can make out the 
scribbled handwriting snuck into this massive, unsearchable PDF. #GOPTaxScam”). For more 
examples of tweets by Congress Members and others, see Thea Glassman, Tweets About Scribbles on 
the Tax Reform Bill Prove People are Disappointed, ELITE DAILY (Dec. 2, 2017), https://www.elitedaily.com/ 
p/tweets-about-scribbles-on-the-tax-reform-bill-prove-people-are-disappointed-6764083. These types 
of concerns have also been echoed in subsequent legislation. See, e.g., Senator Rand Paul 
(@RandPaul), TWITTER (Mar. 22, 2018, 10:02 AM), https://twitter.com/RandPaul/status/976 
836636779728896 (“Well here it is, all 2,232 budget-busting pages. The House already started 
votes on it. The Senate is expected to soon. No one has read it. Congress is broken. . .”). 
 247. Kathryn Watson, Democrats Outraged Over Senate GOP’s Last-Minute Tax Bill Reveal, CBS NEWS 
(Dec. 1, 2017, 10:21 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/democrats-outraged-over-senate-gops-
last-minute-tax-bill-reveal.  
 248. For discussion, see supra Section IV.A.1.  
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generally do not read the text of proposed legislation even prior to actually 
voting on it, interviewees also indicated that in passing major tax legislation, 
it is not uncommon for changes to the statutory text to be made hastily at the 
last minute on the Senate floor.249  
To be sure, the process by which the 2017 tax legislation was passed was 
remarkable on several fronts. For example, it was characterized by strong 
partisanship, with Republicans passing the legislation using the reconciliation 
process, without any Democrat votes, and with minimal opportunity for 
hearings and the undermining of budget estimators.250 However, outrage 
surrounding the lack of opportunity for Members to read the bill language 
papers over the reality that Members had generally not paid attention to the 
actual statutory language long before the 2017 reform. Put differently, 
complaints about the lack of opportunity to read statutory language 
perpetuates a myth that Congress Members are closely engaged with 
evaluating the statutory text as part of the process of passing legislation.  
At the core, public outrage regarding the purported lack of opportunity 
for Members to read legislation suggests a potential disconnect between the 
public’s understandings and expectations of how Congress Members ought 
to consider proposed legislation, and the process by which this actually 
happens. Member complaints in the popular press regarding the lack of 
opportunity to read the legislation may have been mere political posturing 
but may also suggest a desire to perpetuate the myth that Members read 
statutory language before passage. Commentary by mainstream journalists on 
this same lack of opportunity may reflect expectations and understandings of 
the legislative process that are out of sync with reality.  
2. Who Controls Drafting? And Who Should? 
All of this begs the question: Is there a legitimacy problem with the 
process by which legislation is passed? Is the fact that Members do not read 
drafted legislative language and even government counsels pay relatively little 
attention to formulation decisions problematic? If professional drafters are 
really controlling these decisions, what legitimizes their doing so?  
As we examined in Section IV.A, formulation decisions can affect how 
accessible the law is and to whom, and thus have distributive consequences on 
a number of dimensions.251 Moreover, as we described in Section III.B.3.vii, 
those who have power to draft the law have power that extends beyond 
formulation choices, to include significant substantive decisions about the 
 
 249. See supra text accompanying note 127.  
 250. Rebecca M. Kysar & Linda Sugin, Opinion, The Built-In Instability of the G.O.P.’s Tax Bill, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/19/opinion/republican-tax-
bill-unstable.html (remarking on the instability of the legislation in part because it was passed 
without any Democratic votes); Kysar, supra note 20, at 62–63. 
 251. See supra Section IV.A.  
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law.252 Yet, Members do not pay attention to drafted statutory text. Indeed, 
some interviewees even alluded to the benefit of intentionally excluding 
Members from the drafting process, because Member involvement could slow 
down or even upend potential tax legislation.253 The upshot is that, over a 
long period of time, through inattention as well as design, Members have 
ceded a good deal of control over drafting. In doing so, Members have not 
only ceded formulation decisions; they have also ceded power over policy 
decisions that are inextricably intertwined with formulation decisions.254   
So, should we be sanguine about this ceding of control? The answer 
depends, in part, on who control is being ceded to and how such control is 
being wielded. This may have changed over the years. During the creation of 
the 1986 Code, Legislative Counsel drafters—most prominently Ward Hussey 
and John Buckley—exercised extensive control over the drafting of statutory 
language.255 But counsels active in later periods described a move toward a 
more amorphous process, with input from more private sector players, fuzzier 
lines of control, and a less clear dominance by one or two experienced tax 
drafters.256  
This reduction in expert Legislative Counsel control and turn to a more 
diffuse and potentially chaotic drafting process may mirror the increasingly 
“unorthodox legislation” noted by some scholars that has occurred at the 
congressional level.257 Unorthodox legislation is characterized, among other 
things, by an erosion of committee control, more diffuse and political lines of 
control, and the increasing chaos that accompanies the dispersion of power 
among many sources.258 It is possible, though not inevitable, that the control 
of expert drafters (such as the tax House Legislative Counsel) would also 
erode as the power of committees with which they have the closest working 
relationships eroded (such as the House Ways and Means Committee).259  
 
 252. See supra Section III.B.3.vii. 
 253. See supra text accompanying note 129. 
 254. Gluck et al., supra note 20, at 1832–34 (identifying participation of outsiders, such as 
interest groups, and congressional offices, such as the Congressional Budget Office (“CBO”), in 
the drafting of legislation as a type of unorthodox lawmaking and hypothesizing that unorthodox 
drafting could lead to unorthodox delegation of legislative power from Congress, depending on 
who is influencing the drafting); see also Hanah Metchis Volokh, A Read-the-Bill Rule For Congress, 
76 MO. L. REV. 135, 140–48 (2011) (arguing that lawmakers are constitutionally required to 
exercise their judgment when voting on legislation, and that a bill should be passed to prevent 
Members of Congress from delegating away their responsibility to read bills). 
 255. See supra Section III.B.3.ii.  
 256. See supra Section III.B.3.iii.  
 257. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.  
 258. SINCLAIR, supra note 20 (describing these changes in the legislative process and the 
effects of such changes); see also Elizabeth Garrett, The Congressional Budget Process: Strengthening 
the Party-in-Government, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 702, 708–11 (2000) (describing decline in committee 
power and control that is both more diffuse and political).  
 259. It is also theoretically possible that the erosion of power of congressional committees 
could create a decentralization of control at the congressional level that would allow Legislative 
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These types of shifts raise questions regarding how power should be 
allocated among Congressional counsels and staff, and how allocations of 
power at this level affect legitimacy.260 Recent literature, most notably the 
work of Gluck and Bressman, has only very obliquely addressed the question 
of what legitimates different staffers’ involvement in different parts of the 
legislative drafting process. For instance, Gluck and Bressman respond to the 
contention that legislative history is drafted by renegade staff by arguing that 
the staff that drafts legislative history is actually more directly accountable to 
Members than Legislative Counsel.261 Gluck and Bressman point to the fact 
that individual Members cannot fire Legislative Counsel and that Legislative 
Counsel do not lose their jobs as a result of a shift of control in Congress.262  
This begs, but does not answer, the question, of whether and how 
different staffers’ roles in the legislative process need to be legitimated. One 
possibility is to look to the extensive discussion of legitimacy in the context of 
the administrative state.263 The above discussion suggests, in particular, that 
perhaps we should deploy some sort of analogue of the political control 
model from the administrative law context, whereby staffers’ roles are 
legitimated based on their control by politically accountable Members.264 This 
might suggest that we should look favorably upon a shift in drafting control 
 
Counsel to wield more influence. Our interviews did not suggest that this possibility had come to 
pass, but more research would be useful in any event regarding how professional drafters’ roles 
have shifted in response to unorthodox legislation.  
 260. See generally Shobe, supra note 8 (arguing that increased professionalization of drafters 
over time, including that of Legislative Counsel, bolsters the case for textualism). But see Edward 
Kleinbard, Senators Picked Americans’ Pockets via Degraded Tax Policy Process, HILL (Dec. 4, 2017, 
10:00 AM), https://thehill.com/opinion/finance/363096-senators-picked-americans-pockets-via-
degraded-tax-process(noting that JCT and Treasury expertise were ignored in passing the 2017 
tax bill).  
 261. Gluck & Bressman II, supra note 8, at 741 (contrasting ordinary staff who have “greater 
direct accountability to the members” with “Legislative Counsels []who . . . cannot be fired by 
individual members, and do not lose their jobs when control over Congress changes” (footnotes 
omitted)); see also id. at 794 (exploring potential benefits of “transferring more text-writing power 
to policymakers and away from non-policy-oriented drafting staff”).  
 262. Id. at 741.  
 263. The literature is extensive. See generally Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in 
American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1276 (1984) (setting forth an early influential discussion of 
various theories).  
 264. See JOEL D. ABERBACH, KEEPING A WATCHFUL EYE: THE POLITICS OF CONGRESSIONAL 
OVERSIGHT 14, 34–37 (1990) (discussing the expansion of congressional oversight generally); 
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF 
POLITICS 16–23 (2d ed. 1986) (describing judicial review as counter-majoritarian, which helped 
spur a majoritarian paradigm of democratic legitimacy and therefore the accountability approach 
to legitimate administrative agencies); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency Inaction: An 
Arbitrariness Approach, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1657, 1677 (2004) (describing dominance of the 
“presidential control model” as a means of legitimating administrative agencies); Elena Kagan, 
Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2331–39 (2001) (making foundational 
accountability argument for presidential control of administrative agencies). 
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away from Legislative Counsel and toward political counsels who are more 
directly subject to Members’ control. 
But our findings suggest that there are risks to such a shift. First, shifting 
power closer to Member staff may understate the value of having a highly 
skilled expert drafter at the helm who is able to ensure the technical integrity 
of a complex statute by accurately translating policy into statutory language. 
More problematically, arguments in favor of such a shift may overestimate the 
extent to which a lesser degree of expert control will be replaced by an 
accountable alternative. What we instead heard from interviewees was that a 
decline in Legislative Counsel dominance has coincided with more private 
sector interests providing legislative language and more of a personality-
driven jockeying for power by other staffers.265 Meanwhile, Members 
themselves still do not read the language, and even high-level counsels pay 
more attention to policy than statutory language.266 This suggests the risk that 
a loss of centralizing, expert control over drafting may be replaced by a less 
disciplined alternative, rather than a more accountable system.  
This analysis suggests that perhaps we need to look elsewhere in thinking 
about legitimating staffers’ roles in the legislative process.267 Or, to the extent 
that we think that staffers’ roles need no legitimating because they act as 
“mere transmission belt[s]”268 for Congress, perhaps we need to be more 
explicit about and prepared to defend such a theory. Or perhaps some 
combination of theories is the most fruitful approach. We do not seek to 
resolve the question in this Article, but rather underscore fundamental 
questions about the legitimacy of drafting practices that merit deeper 
examination than exists in the current literature.  
 
 265. See supra Section III.B.3.iii. Another key characteristic of the 2017 tax reform was the 
speed of enactment, which reduced the opportunity of many constituencies to carefully consider 
the legislation. Focusing on this factor suggests that, had the 1986 Act been pushed through 
Congress as quickly as the 2017 tax reform was, it is possible that no centralization of expert 
control would have been able to overcome the time pressures. There may be some truth to this. 
However, time pressure is not new. Counsels active during the 1980s as well as more recently 
active counsels both mentioned time pressure as a constant force and a factor leading to drafting 
imperfections. Similarly, counsels active in the 1980s also described the last-minute drafting 
frenzy that accompanies major legislation. Moreover, computerization, email, and data storage 
are all factors that make the process more efficient and may mean that the same sort of 
deliberation can happen during a much shorter time today. 
 266. See supra Section III.B.3.ii. 
 267. See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, Speech, From Expertise to Politics: The Transformation of American 
Rulemaking, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 745, 755–56 (1996) (discussing earlier view of agencies as 
apolitical experts as well as the more recent turn away from this model toward political view). 
 268. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. 
REV. 1667, 1675 (1975) (describing early transmission belt model in the context of the 
administrative state).  
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3. The Future of Tax Reform 
Understanding long-standing drafting dynamics may also help us better 
predict the future of the recent tax reform. For instance, in evaluating the 
2017 tax reform, many commentators have suggested that extensive technical 
corrections will be needed to clean up mistakes that were made by hasty 
drafting, and, indeed, prominent lawmakers themselves have promised that 
technical corrections will be used to clean up the legislation.269 Our study 
shows how, while not impossible, such technical corrections will have to 
overcome significant barriers. As previously discussed, our interviewees 
explained that technical corrections are often quite difficult to accomplish.270 
This is due in part to Member and staff suspicion that technical corrections 
may not be merely technical, and also due to the reluctance to use scarce 
congressional resources to fix past mistakes.271 The difficulty in passing 
technical corrections may be even greater for controversial legislation passed 
through a divided Congress.272  
D. FUTURE RESEARCH 
Beyond the implications we discussed above, various themes that arose in 
our semi-structured interviews suggested avenues for future exploration. For 
instance, some interviewees identified a lesser presence of executive branch 
officials in drafting over time. Interviewees pointed to various explanations, 
such as conflicts between Congress and the administration, executive branch 
officials’ desires to stay away, the elimination of an IRS division dedicated to 
legislation and regulations, and the advent of email. These findings suggest 
that much may be learned by exploring the relationship between 
congressional committees and their executive branch counterparts, and by 
investigating how such relationships have shifted over time and how this shift 
may affect the law’s creation and administration.  
Another theme that arose in our interviews was a shift in partisanship in 
the process over time. Some interviewees lamented a move away from a less 
partisan process of creating the law to a more partisan process in which the 
minority party’s views have less of a place.273 But other recent drafters 
 
 269. See, e.g., Stephen K. Cooper, Brady Says to Expect Passthrough Changes, Technical Corrections, 
2017 TAX NOTES TODAY 237-1. 
 270. See supra Section III.B.2.ii. 
 271. See supra Section III.B.2.ii.   
 272. See, e.g., Stephen K. Cooper, Democrats Unlikely to Support Tax Technical Corrections in 2018, 
2017 TAX NOTES TODAY 242-4 (describing how Democrats are not in the mood to support 
technical corrections in 2018); Jonathan Bernstein, Why the Tax Bill’s Errors Won’t Be Fixed, 
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 12, 2017, 4:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-12-
12/why-the-tax-bill-s-errors-won-t-be-fixed (explaining why it will be very difficult to get technical 
corrections passed).  
 273. See George K. Yin, Crafting Structural Tax Legislation in a Highly Polarized Congress (Va. Pub. 
Law & Legal Theory Research Paper No. 2017-58; Va. Law and Econs. Research. Paper No. 2017-25, 
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suggested that, even though Congress itself may be more partisan, staffers 
would try to work across party lines in good faith. This dynamic, if it exists, 
raises the intriguing prospect of a less partisan congressional staffer deep 
state, the inner workings of which merit exploration.  
In addition, many interviewees referred to and sometimes lamented the 
shift in markup practices in the House to a markup of actual legislative 
language (as opposed to a policy markup) and offered various reasons for and 
thoughts about this shift. The implications of this shift are worth further 
investigation. For instance, did the change in markup practice affect the 
shape of legislation? What would the answer to this question tell us about how 
drafting practices should ideally be structured? 
Finally, though some interviewees spoke about the choice to delegate 
drafting decisions to Treasury Regulation writers, this Article has not probed 
how drafting choices interact with regulatory choices. The implications of how 
these decisions are made could be profound, and we explore this subject in 
other work.274  
These findings and others we uncovered from our conversations with our 
interviewees were not the principal subject of our inquiry, so we were not able 
to develop them either empirically or theoretically in this Article. We hope to 
investigate some of these topics in future work.  
V. CONCLUSION  
In this Article, we investigated how and why drafting choices are made in 
the formulation of tax statutes, and we analyzed the implications of these 
choices. We conducted extensive interviews with government counsels who 
were involved in the creation of tax legislation over the past four decades. 
These interviews produced a wealth of information about how tax law is made 
and, in particular, how discrete drafting decisions are made as part of that 
process. We explored how these findings have important implications for 
statutory interpretation, the tax system, and the legislative process.  
Fundamentally, this Article uncovers an aspect of legislative drafting that 
is generally hidden from view: how and why decisions are made to put 
particular words in the statute books. We found that these decisions both 
reflect and perpetuate particular visions of lawmaking and administration. 





2018) (manuscript 5–6), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3059184 (documenting 
recent polarization in Congress in general, and in the House Ways and Means Committee and 
Senate Finance Committee in particular).  
 274. See Shu-Yi Oei & Leigh Osofsky, Post-Enactment Politicking: Agency Rulemaking After Hasty 
Legislation, (working paper) (on file with author); cf. Christopher J. Walker, Legislating in the 
Shadows, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1377, 1382–87 (2017) (exploring agency involvement in statutory drafting).  
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APPENDIX: INTERVIEW SCRIPT FOR SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS 
These questions are to be used as a guide to begin conversation.  
Opening/Setup: We are conducting research on the tax legislative 
process. Specifically, we are interested in how drafting choices are made in 
the tax legislative process and what, if any, the effects of those choices might 
be. We are conducting interviews with counsel and staff who have been 
involved with the drafting and creation of tax legislation to investigate these 
issues.   
1. Could you tell us a bit of background about your experience with the 
tax legislative drafting process?  
a. In what capacity and on what committee did you serve?  
b. For what years (how long)? 
2. How often did your committee get primary drafting responsibility for 
drafting legislation?  
a. Or, did legislation arrive at your feet already drafted?  
b. If the legislation arrived on your desk already drafted, who did the 
drafting? 
3. Once a certain policy or scheme has been agreed upon in principle, 
who makes decisions regarding the drafting of the tax statutes? Where/in 
what committee/by what person in such committee do these decisions 
get made? 
a. Does the process of figuring out how to draft tax legislation change 
the substantive legal rule?  
4. What was the role of congressional staff persons (i.e., staff of individual 
congresspersons) and/or lobbyists and/or executive branch officials in 
the drafting of tax legislation? How often was legislation drafted by those 
actors, relative to being solely drafted by congressional drafting 
committees? 
5. We are particularly interested in how decisions about presentation of 
the rule in the statute get made. How, in your experience were drafting 
decisions made when there were multiple ways to present the same legal 
content?  
6. How, if at all, did the process of drafting tax legislation differ if the 
legislation changed an existing tax statute (for instance, by adding an 
additional distinction or exception to an already existing statutory 
provision) versus if the legislation addressed new subject matter not 
already covered by tax statutes?  
7. We have noticed that general rules combined with exceptions 
(“exception-based drafting”) can achieve the same substantive goals as a 
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general rule that encompasses definitions or commonly understood 
terms (“definition-based drafting”). 
a. Is this phenomenon something you have observed or thought 
about?  
b. If so, what are some examples that come to mind?  
c. Based on your observations and work at the [insert committee(s)], 
why do you think some statutes are drafted using “exception-based 
drafting” rather than “definition-based drafting”? Are there certain 
factors or considerations that explain the choice the between the two?  
d. Did you ever have to make choices regarding whether to use 
“exception-based drafting” or “definition-based drafting”? If so, 
please tell us about the choice, what you chose, why you made the 
choice, and what, if any, consequences you think flowed from that 
choice. 
e. Looking back on it, what consequences, if any, do you think flowed 
from the choice to use “definition-based drafting” versus “exception-
based drafting?” Does your answer depend on context and, if so, how?   
8. We have noticed that sometimes in the Code exceptions appear to 
“swallow the general rule.”  
a. Is this phenomenon something you have observed or thought 
about?  
b. If so, what are some examples that come to mind?  
c. In these situations, wouldn’t it be possible to draft the statute to 
create a narrower general rule (rather than having a giant 
exception)?  
d. Based on your observations and work at the [insert committee(s)], 
why do you think some statutes use “exception swallows the rule 
drafting” rather than “narrower general rule” drafting?  
e. Based on your observations and work at the [insert committee(s)], 
are there general principles that you believe explain when “exception 
swallows the rule” drafting is used, rather than “narrower general rule 
drafting”? Are there certain factors or considerations that explain the 
choice between the two? 
f. Did you ever have to make choices regarding whether to use 
“exception-swallows the rule drafting” or “narrower general rule 
drafting”? If so, please tell us about the choice, what you chose, why 
you made the choice, and what, if any, consequences you think flowed 
from that choice. 
g. Looking back on it, what consequences do you think might have 
flowed from the choice to use “exception swallows the rule drafting” 
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versus “narrower general rule drafting”? Does your answer depend on 
context and, if so, how?   
9. We have noticed that exceptions to a rule are often contained and 
addressed with the same rule. We refer to this as “same section general 
rule and exceptions.” But we have also noticed that sometimes the 
exception is not contained within the same section and may not even be 
referred to explicitly as an exception to the prior rule. We refer to this as 
“apparently independent rules” drafting.   
a. Is this phenomenon something you have observed or thought 
about?  
b. If so, what are some examples that come to mind? 
c. Based on your observations and work at the [insert committee(s)], 
why do you think some provisions are presented as “apparently 
independent rules,” rather than as “same section general rule and 
exceptions”? Are there certain factors or considerations that explain 
the choice between the two? 
d. Based on your observations and work at the [insert committee(s)], 
are there general principles that you believe explain when 
“apparently independent rules” drafting is used, rather than “same 
section general rule and exceptions”? 
e. Did you ever have to make choices regarding whether to use 
“apparently independent rules” or “same section general rule and 
exceptions”? If so, please tell us about the choice, what you chose, 
why you made the choice, and what, if any, consequences you think 
flowed from that choice. 
f. Looking back on it, what consequences do you think may have 
flowed from the choice to use “apparently independent rules” versus 
“same section general rule and exceptions”? Does your answer 
depend on context and, if so, how?   
10. We have noticed that sometimes a particular code section will have its 
own definition for a specific term (for instance: income). Other times, a 
code section would rely on a definition offered in another provision 
(cross-references). Other times, a code section would use a word that 
could have been defined but offer no definition, either within the section 
or via cross reference.  
a. Is this phenomenon something you have observed or thought 
about?  
b. If so, what are some examples that come to mind? 
c. Based on your observations and work at the [insert committee(s)], 
are there general principles that you believe explain when these 
approaches are used?  
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d. Did you ever have to make choices regarding whether to use 
“within section definitions,” “cross-referenced definitions,” or “no 
definition drafting”? If so, please tell us about the choice, what you 
chose, why you made the choice, and what, if any, consequences you 
think flowed from that choice. 
e. Looking back on it, what consequences do you think may have 
flowed from the choice to use “within section definitions,” “cross-
referenced definitions,” or “no definition drafting”? Does your 
answer depend on context and, if so, how?   
11. Did prior drafting choices for an existing Code section or sections in 
any way affect your ability to draft new legal content?  
12. Does the way tax statutes are actually written (i.e., the form) matter? 
In general, who is the audience for drafted statutes? 
13. What do you think the key drafters of tax legislation might say about 
complexity/charges that the Code is too complex? 
14. Are there any other questions you think we need to be asking to 
understand the drafting choices that are made for presenting legal 
content? Are we asking the right questions? What other interesting 
features of the technical statutory drafting process do you think we should 
be asking about? 
15. Might you have suggestions for other people who were involved in 
legislative drafting process we should be talking to?  
